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Words on Paper 
 
 In August of 1975 the leaders of 35 states gathered in Helsinki, Finland to 
sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE). They had little idea what consequences the words on the paper could 
bring, and many of them probably would not have signed if they had known. The 
agreement and the review process it established contained new opportunities to 
transcend boundaries and advocate for changes in governance. The Final Act, 
which formally acknowledged the borders and regimes of Eastern Europe, spelled 
out principles upon which European governance would be based including 
peaceful relations among states, as well as respect for human rights and openness 
in human contact and information transfer. The CSCE, thanks to the efforts of 
dissidents and diplomats, would become a primary means through which human 
rights values would shape the Cold War confrontation and the eventual 
reconciliation between the Soviet Union and the West. 
 The Helsinki Final Act was a lengthy agreement establishing norms of 
international relations in Europe. It was signed on August 1, 1975 by thirty-three 
European countries, including the entire Warsaw Pact, and by the United States 
and Canada. The final version of the Act contained five sections. The three major 
sections were “Questions Relating to Security in Europe;” “Co-operation in the 
Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment;” and 
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“Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields.” They were respectively 
referred to as Basket I, Basket II, and Basket III during the negotiation and 
drafting process. Basket I included a set of ten principles that would govern 
relations between states. The Final Act also contained a brief section entitled 
Questions Relating to Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, and a 
section regarding the Follow-up to the Conference.1 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe saw years of 
debating, revising, and compromising by the Soviet bloc and the West before the 
Final Act was signed in Helsinki on August 1, 1975. While the CSCE process 
included a lot of tedious diplomatic wrangling that could seem at first glance to be 
of doubtful value, the diplomatic contest established a shift in the Cold War 
rivalry with far-reaching consequences. Initially, Soviet General Secretary Leonid 
Brezhnev led the effort to take the diplomatic initiative for Soviet socialism by 
promoting a congress of European states. Their ideological challenge was met 
primarily by West European delegations who insisted that humanitarian issues 
were relevant to security and cooperation. By signing the Final Act, the Soviet 
bloc formally accepted that human rights and the free movement of people and 
information were to be among the foundations of European order, and the 
Western signatories, including all NATO countries, officially recognized the 
borders of Soviet-dominated regimes of Eastern Europe. The Soviet delegates 
understood that the human rights principles were directed against their system of 
                                                 
1 “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act,” August 1, 1975. Reproduced 
from an official text provided by the US Department of State in International Legal Materials, 
Vol. 14, No. 5, September 1975, American Society of International Law, 1292-1325. 
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rule, but begrudgingly accepted them in order to achieve the important symbolic 
victory of official recognition for Second World War conquests, to strengthen the 
Communist position in the diplomatic struggle over divided Germany, and to 
enhance their international prestige, which had suffered from the crushing of 
Czechoslovak reform and the rise of dissidents.  
After 1975, transnational activists and Western governments used the 
Final Act and the CSCE Follow-Up Conferences to challenge the Soviet Union’s 
human rights practices. Soon after the signing of the act a grassroots struggle to 
implement Helsinki human rights norms was taken up by an emerging dissident 
movement in the Soviet Union. While the Soviet government soon suppressed 
Helsinki activists in the USSR, the activists were still able to influence opinion 
about the country and would emerge in the less repressive Gorbachev era with a 
platform for change. The United States led vigorous challenges to the Eastern 
bloc in the CSCE, decrying the failures of the Soviet Union and its closest allies 
to live up to the Final Act’s human rights agreements during follow-up 
conferences. While Helsinki activism also took place in some of the Soviet 
satellite countries, most prominently by Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
Union was the dominant member of the Warsaw Pact and the primary actor in 
negotiations with the West. Thus, a focus on the Soviet Union is warranted. 
For dissidents in the Soviet bloc, Helsinki activism had the advantage of a 
unifying platform that Communist governments had signed their support for (the 
Final Act), increased international support (the transnational network and the 
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international spotlight of the CSCE process), and the inclusion of both powerful 
players with political and economic leverage as well as activists planting Helsinki 
principles into international norms. Dissidents recognized that the CSCE process 
had potential for encouraging change in the Soviet Union. Dissidents had already 
been using international contacts and the terminology of human rights, and the 
CSCE inspired further development of transnational networks and international 
accountability processes. Recognizing the importance the Soviet leadership 
placed on the CSCE, dissidents would advocate for the use of the CSCE process 
as leverage to encourage reform even before the signing of the Final Act, and 
soon afterwards used the Act as a basis for human rights principles and used the 
international attention of the CSCE to broadcast Soviet failures to live up to these 
principles. 
The efforts of government and non-government actors established human 
rights norms as an important part of international diplomacy. The US 
Congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe established 
human rights compliance within CSCE as an official concern of the US 
government. The Carter administration and its approach to the CSCE bolstered 
this commitment and established human rights as a primary topic in CSCE 
follow-up meetings with the help of West European delegations. A series of 
transnational activist groups, including Helsinki Watch in the United States, 
helped highlight abuses and maintain public pressure on governments. Helsinki 
groups operated within the Cold War environment, but as independent actors open 
to citizen participation they managed to assert human rights as a continuing 
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transnational societal concern and not merely a political weapon of East-West 
confrontation.  
The Final Act’s concept of human rights became a major component in the 
ideological aspect of the East-West confrontation and eventual reconciliation. 
Perceptions of human rights and violations of human rights were colored by 
ideology, whether Soviet or Western. Soviet leaders viewed their country as 
guaranteeing important rights including work and housing, and maintained that 
troublemakers and Western imperialists only used “so-called ‘human rights’” as a 
cover for dangerous subversive activity. Western leaders saw the human rights 
abuses of the Soviet Union and its allies as proof that Communists disregarded 
freedom, and tended to overlook abuses by Western allies or non-aligned states in 
the CSCE. When the Soviet Union’s human rights policies began to conform 
more to the standards set in the CSCE, upholding human rights became a more 
cooperative than confrontational endeavor. Trust between the USSR and the West 
then increased as ideological conflict decreased. 
The CSCE played a major role in working out the principles upon which a 
united Europe would rest. The principles served as conditions which the Eastern 
Bloc would need to strive for in order to be truly integrated into Europe. 
Fulfillment of the agreement also served to measure the trustworthiness of the 
Soviet Union. While the CSCE process and the Helsinki Final Act did not launch 
Soviet dissent nor serve as the sole source of pressure on the Soviet Union for 
human rights improvement, it was one of the most influential diplomatic 
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processes owing to the importance that Soviet leaders, Western governments, and 
Soviet dissidents placed on it. 
 
The influence of the CSCE on the Soviet Union is best assessed with an 
understanding of literature in both Cold War history and Soviet history genres. 
This essay attempts to integrate diplomatic history with Soviet political history to 
understand Soviet policy regarding the CSCE and human rights from the launch 
of the Conference to the new political situation at the end of 1989. It contributes 
to understanding how the CSCE process fit into the Cold War and Soviet politics, 
but does not attempt to list all pressures and influences on the Soviet Union or 
compare their relative weight. It is clear, however, that the effect of the CSCE 
must be taken into account to gain a full picture of the end of the Cold War and 
Soviet reforms of the late 1980s. Although it is difficult to assess the influence of 
numerous factors on Soviet decision-making, Soviet documents, diplomatic 
correspondence, and memoirs shed light on the concerns and values of the Soviet 
leadership. 
When histories of the Cold War discuss the Final Act, it tends to be 
examined within the broader context of détente and human rights. Vladislav M. 
Zubok, in his book A Failed Empire, discusses the Final Act in the context of 
superpower confrontation and Soviet leaders being cautious not to disrupt détente 
with embarrassing cases of repression. Zubok stresses that Soviet General 
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev wanted to be remembered as a peacemaker. The 
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Soviets agreed to the Third Basket in exchange for Western acceptance of the 
territorial and political status quo. Although the Final Act initially outraged 
ideological conservatives in the Politburo, they were calmed by Foreign Minister 
Andrei Gromyko’s insistence that the Soviets got what they wanted and that as far 
as human rights were concerned, “we remain the masters in our own house.” 
While Zubok writes that “the commitments to human rights embedded in the act 
proved to be a time bomb under the Soviet regime,” his later chapters give do not 
discuss the CSCE, and focus instead on the initiative of Mikhail Gorbachev and 
his enlightened aides, the growing appeal of the West, and the Gorbachev-Reagan 
relationship. Imperial overreach, economic trouble, and the Chernobyl disaster 
serve as additional motivations for reform. However, human rights, along with 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, remained important criteria for Reagan’s 
assessment of Soviet intentions.2  
Melvyn P. Leffler also presents Brezhnev as an aspiring peacemaker. With 
World War II shaping his life experience, Brezhnev “wanted peace and stability 
in Europe,” which required the formal recognition of East Germany and the 
acceptance of the Oder-Neisse border between East Germany and Poland. 
Brezhnev accepted the tradeoff of human rights in return for the recognition of the 
territorial status quo. Particularly with the promises of Nixon and Kissinger to not 
interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, Brezhnev believed the West had 
                                                 
2 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to 
Gorbachev (North Carolina, 2009), 231, 237-238. 
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been rebuffed and the Final Act’s human rights commitments did not seriously 
threaten Communist rule.3 
Major works discussing the CSCE and human rights include books by 
Sarah Snyder, Daniel Thomas, and Alexis Heraclides, as well as an essay by 
Svetlana Savranskaya. In The Helsinki Effect, Thomas chronicles the development 
of human rights norms in international diplomacy and how this affected activism 
in the Soviet bloc. Believing that the norms established by the CSCE would 
ultimately have little effect, Soviet leaders agreed to their inclusion in return for 
recognition of post-war borders. The CSCE established a process of 
“transnational socialization” through domestic and international demands for 
compliance with human rights norms, which set in motion revolutionary changes 
resulting in the end of communist rule in 1989-1990.4 While Thomas is careful to 
note that Helsinki and human rights activism is not a mono-causal explanation for 
transitions in the Soviet bloc, his reliance on discussions with Helsinki activists 
and his presentation of dissidence prior to 1975 suggests that he might be 
overemphasizing the Helsinki effect. In Human Rights Activism and the End of 
the Cold War, Sarah B. Snyder effectively shows how advocacy by transnational 
activists and their communication with activists in the Soviet bloc put Helsinki 
principles into effect. However, her focus on the human rights issue does not give 
a clear picture of where human rights fit into the Cold War confrontation and her 
                                                 
3 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the Cold 
War (New York, 2007), 241, 249. 
4 Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism. (Princeton, 2001), 35, 61, 284-287. 
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emphasis on human rights without enough contextual caveats or examination of 
Soviet internal politics implies an overly-prominent place for the Helsinki process 
in the Cold War.5 Security and Cooperation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 
by Alexis Heraclides, contributes thorough detail on humanitarian issues within 
the diplomatic process of the CSCE. Another valuable source is Svetlana 
Savranskaya’s essay “Human Rights Movement in the USSR After the Signing of 
the Helsinki Final Act, and the Reaction of Soviet Authorities.”  While 
Savranskaya’s essay is short, it provides helpful details on how Soviet dissidents 
were affected by the Final Act and how the KGB reacted. In addition, articles by 
Angela Romano and Michael Cotey Morgan describe how the Soviets aimed at 
seeking greater international legitimacy and increasing stability in Europe.6 
Valuable works in the field of Soviet history that discuss Soviet reform 
include Armageddon Averted by Stephen Kotkin and The Gorbachev Factor by 
Archie Brown. Kotkin focuses mostly on Soviet economic and structural 
problems and Gorbachev’s belief in a better Communism. However, he does 
include the CSCE among the Western pressures on the Soviet Union. The Final 
Act “led to an international legal and moral ‘full court press’ that Soviet 
diplomats and negotiators felt alongside Western military, economic, and political 
                                                 
5 Sarah B. Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History 
of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge, 2011). 
6 Angela Romano, “The Main Task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering Détente in 
Europe” in Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, eds, Perforating the Iron Curtain: European 
Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985 (Copenhagen, 2010); 
Michael Cotey Morgan, “The United States and the Making of the Helsinki Final Act,” in 
Frederick Longevall and Andrew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 
1969-1977, (Oxford, 2008), 164-182. 
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might.”7 The Gorbachev Factor focuses on Gorbachev’s critical influence, and 
discusses his background, beliefs, appointments, and shifts in policy. While it 
does not discuss the CSCE, it does highlight Gorbachev’s affinity for the West.8   
 The CSCE process, which included the work of activists in the Soviet bloc 
and their advocates in the West, was one important factor driving reform in the 
Soviet Union and the dissolution of Cold War divisions in Europe. It started as a 
Soviet diplomatic initiative to assert the leadership of Soviet socialism. Soon 
West Europeans fought to include humanitarian standards in the principles of 
European order. Then Soviet dissidents would convince the West to take up the 
human rights struggle, which was most vigorously pursued by the United States. 
Finally, the Soviet Union adopted Helsinki human rights principles, helping to 








                                                 
7 Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000, (Oxford, 2001), 24. 




Brezhnev and Europe, 1968-1975 
 
 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe originated in 
Soviet efforts to advance their interests while avoiding a major war. Through the 
drafting of the principles upon which stability in Europe was to lie, the CSCE 
became a forum to contest the meaning of European order. Despite misgivings, 
Soviet officials approved of signing the Final Act with the human rights principles 
that West Europeans insisted on including. They went ahead with the Final Act 
primarily because they believed it would boost their international prestige, which 
Brezhnev tied to his personal image as a statesman. An official World War II 
settlement was a huge political success when Soviet identity was tied firmly to the 
victory against fascism. Fears of West German revanchist politics contributed to 
the Soviets’ sense of urgency. The CSCE was part of sincere efforts to normalize 
relations with the West, but Soviet leaders wanted to have peace on their terms 
and establish better conditions for expanding Soviet ideological hegemony. The 
Soviet ideological offensive involved recovering prestige they had lost by 
crushing reform in Czechoslovakia and recovering the regime’s attraction after 
the emergence of dissidents. Their ideological challenge was met by the West, 
primarily West Europeans. The Final Act was the result of intense diplomatic 
struggle. Its effects on Soviet politics and the Cold War were rooted in the 
struggles surrounding its creation. 
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Participants in the CSCE process, as well as historians, have recognized 
that the Soviets reluctantly accepted the human rights principles and the 
requirements for open communication and travel in return for recognition of their 
dominance in Eastern Europe. In a 1974 memorandum, a US official recognized 
that the European delegates were “reluctant to consider further compromise” until 
the Soviets continued negotiations on matters of “human contacts.” The Soviet 
delegation was less than enthusiastic.9 Eventually the Soviets would agree to the 
inclusion of the Basket III principles regarding free movement of people and 
access to information. They would also assent to “Respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or 
belief” being recognized as one of the ten principles guiding relations among 
states listed in Basket I. 
 While some of the questions that need to be addressed in answering why 
the Soviet Union accepted human rights principles in the CSCE are discussed in 
the historiography, questions remain about why the Soviets put so much 
importance on official Western recognition of the postwar status quo. The 
historiography shows that the Soviets viewed the human rights principles as a 
threat that they could deal with. However, it is less clear why the Soviet 
leadership attached so much importance to the recognition of its gains in Eastern 
Europe. By the early 1970s the West was not seriously challenging the status quo 
that had existed in Eastern Europe for over two decades. Soviet hegemony was 
                                                 
9 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary 
of State Kissinger, June 30, 1974, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, Vol. 
39, Doc 227. 
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confirmed as recently as their 1968 military invasion of Czechoslovakia to ensure 
the monopoly of Communist Party rule. In addition, bilateral agreements were 
being made at the time between Western and Eastern bloc countries. The Soviet 
approach to the CSCE was based on how they viewed their gains and losses, how 
they understood the territorial recognition gained in the Final Act and how they 
assessed the degree to which Western proposals threatened their rule. 
 To Soviet officials, official recognition for their World War II gains was 
an important victory. It meant international recognition for the immense sacrifice 
and glorious victory against fascism by the forces of liberation led by the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As Brezhnev remarked in a speech 
commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the victory against Germany, “in the 
course of the 20th century, our country has twice stood at the source of major 
changes in the face of the world,” the first being the October Revolution that 
installed Bolshevik rule, and the second being “the rout of fascism, in which the 
Soviet Union played the decisive role.”10 In a 1972 speech commemorating the 
fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the USSR, Brezhnev plainly connected 
the war to the European security conference. He proclaimed that the Soviet people 
remembered the two world wars “burst into their homes from the West, from 
Europe.” They would remember 1941 and the twenty million Soviet people killed 
                                                 
10 Lenoid Brezhnev, “A Great Exploit of the Soviet People,” May 8, 1975, Following Lenin’s 
Course: Speeches and Articles (Moscow, 1975), 551. 
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during the war “as we complete the historic work of guaranteeing the 
immutability of the postwar European settlement.”11  
 The importance of the war was not limited to the statements of politicians. 
Stephen Kotkin writes that Victory Day, commemorating the end of the war, “was 
a powerful collective ritual, involving family trips to the cemetery, whose 
meaning was shared by almost the entire country.” It also “underscored the 
attainment of superpower status.”12 Eduard Shevardnadze, who would eventually 
become Foreign Minister under Gorbachev, remarked that “The war shaped me as 
it did millions of my contemporaries. It formed my convictions and purpose in 
life.”13 World War II remained a powerful rallying banner for the Soviet Union in 
the 1970s. The importance of the war experience to the Soviets was understood at 
the time by Western political leaders. In a December 1974 conversation between 
French and American officials, Henry Kissinger noted that Brezhnev wanted the 
final conference to be held “before the anniversary of the Second World War,” 
which did not happen because the Western allies delayed the conference. French 
President Valery Giscard d’Estang acknowledged that “They think this is the final 
price of the war, and that is why they want it before May. It is for [Brezhnev] the 
last price of détente also.”14  
                                                 
11 Brezhnev, “The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” December 21, 
1972, Following Lenin’s Course, 89. 
12 Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 45. 
13 Shevardnadze was born in 1928. Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (New 
York, 1991), 13.  
14 Memorandum of Conversation, December 15, 1974, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 39, Doc 267. 
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Brezhnev’s personal ambitions influenced the CSCE process. The 
Conference would be his crowning achievement as a great Soviet statesmen and 
peacemaker. By gaining ratification of the World War II settlement, Brezhnev 
showed that he could do what Stalin and Khrushchev had failed to accomplish.15 
The signing of the Final Act was initially seen by Brezhnev as the consummation 
of decades of Soviet diplomacy and the peak of Soviet international influence.16 
Daniel Thomas notes that as negotiations dragged on, Brezhnev became 
“increasingly anxious to claim victory in the CSCE in time for the Twenty-fifth 
Communist Party Congress,” scheduled for February 1976, where he would 
proclaim the successes of his leadership to Communist Party officials.17 The 
Helsinki Final Act would provide official recognition of Soviet gains in the 
Second World War. Brezhnev had attained a grand agreement of peace which, 
importantly, he viewed as being settled on Soviet terms. 
It was only after a hard political struggle that Brezhnev reached the top 
position in the USSR, which enabled him to institute his détente program, and he 
hoped that his achievements in foreign affairs would provide a substantial portion 
of the clout he needed to stay on top. Vladislav Zubok characterizes Brezhnev as 
“a centrist politician and an enemy of radical political moves in any direction.” 
When Nikita Khrushchev was ousted in 1964, Brezhnev was only one member of 
                                                 
15 Carole Fink, “Facing Leonid Brezhnev and Each Other During the High Era of Détente: Nixon, 
Brandt, and Meir, 1969-1974.” (lecture, Columbia Seminar on Twentieth-Century Politics and 
Society, New York, November 16, 2011). 
16 Svetlana Savranskaya, “Human Rights Movement in the USSR After the Signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act, and the Reaction of Soviet Authorities,” in Leopoldo Nuti, ed, The Crisis of 
Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985 (New York, 2009), 37. 
17 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 81. 
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the cabal that succeeded him, and by no means the most prominent. Alexei 
Kosygin appeared to be the top statesman and took a leading role in foreign 
affairs. However, Brezhnev, despite his limited education and earlier lack of 
ability to inspire confidence as a leader, began to rise. From 1967 to 1968 he 
consolidated his party constituency and removed many rivals from positions of 
authority. Brezhnev understood that he could not compete with Kosygin in the 
area of domestic economy, but would be able to outshine Kosygin in foreign 
affairs. Although Brezhnev’s military reforms oversaw drastic increases in 
nuclear armaments, in foreign policy he came to rely not on dogmatic 
conservatives but on a few policy experts, particularly Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko. Gromyko admired Stalin’s diplomacy during the Grand Alliance years 
and tried to avoid the overuse of ideology in foreign affairs. His primary goal was 
to obtain Western recognition of the new borders of the USSR and Soviet 
satellites in Central Europe.18 Détente was a personal project of Brezhnev and his 
advisors, who needed to defend their policies and their positions from hard-line 
rivals. 
Brezhnev’s response to Czechoslovakia’s 1968 reforms was his first major 
test of leadership, and it would have profound effects on the USSR’s international 
position and legitimacy. His order to send Warsaw Pact forces to Czechoslovakia 
in August 1968 confirmed the monopoly of Communist Party power within the 
                                                 
18 Major territorial changes included the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which 
became Soviet republics, the shifting of Poland’s borders westward into pre-war Germany, and the 
shifting of the Soviet border westward into the former territories of several states. The USSR also 
saw itself as defending the sovereign German Democratic Republic (East Germany) from Western 
revanchists and Nazi sympathizers. Zubok, A Failed Empire, 194-195, 201, 204-206. 
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Soviet sphere of interest, but also undermined international perceptions of Soviet 
legitimacy. A Communist government had been established in Czechoslovakia in 
the immediate postwar period and the country was a member of the Warsaw Pact. 
In early 1968, the country’s Communist leadership under Alexander Dubcek 
began a set of reforms that came to be known as the Prague Spring. They relaxed 
restrictions on cultural expression and on the freedom of association, and the 
government even took steps to end the political monopoly of the Communist 
Party.19  
Dubcek’s reforms shook up the entire Warsaw Pact. Brezhnev, who had 
supported the appointment of Dubcek, was personally at risk of losing his power. 
For example, the Ukrainian first secretary blamed the Prague Spring on 
Brezhnev’s “rotten liberalism” while the leaders of Poland and East Germany 
pushed for military intervention in Czechoslovakia and openly criticized 
Brezhnev as too emotional, naïve, and non-committal. Supporters and opponents 
of intervention shouted at each other in the party headquarters in Moscow. 
Brezhnev agonized over how to respond. He started taking tranquilizers, a habit 
that he would never overcome. After KGB chair Yuri Andropov falsely depicted 
the Czechs as preparing for an armed uprising and Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko gave assurance that the West would not intervene, Brezhnev approved 
the invasion.20 On August 20, in the largest Soviet military movement since 
World War II, Soviet troops, along with tens of thousands of troops from Poland, 
                                                 
19 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 34. 
20 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 207-208; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 239. 
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Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria, entered Czechoslovakia. Soldiers seized 
key buildings and Soviet authorities removed reformers from power as tanks 
entered the streets to assert control. Initially Dubcek was pressured to lead an anti-
reformist government, but he would be forced to step down in April to make room 
for Gustav Husak, a Slovak party leader the Soviets had come to look favorably 
upon as a reliable hardliner. By mid-1970 the Husak government expelled Dubcek 
from the Party and instituted a series of purges instituted.21 
The suppression of the Prague Spring dealt a severe blow to the appeal of 
Soviet socialism, which had crushed “socialism with a human face.” Many 
members of Communist parties in the West began to turn away from the Soviet 
Union, and the Communist parties of Italy and Spain openly condemned the 
Soviet invasion.22 China denounced the invasion and reinforced its troops at the 
Soviet border. Albania severed its last ties with the USSR. Even Romania, a 
Warsaw Pact member, ridiculed the invasion.23 Within the Soviet Union there was 
also cause for concern. The KGB warned that the majority of undergraduates at 
Soviet universities were impressed by the Czech students. “What has attracted 
especially great interest is the creation of opposition parties. The very word 
‘opposition’ is something students find appealing,” concluded KGB director Yuri 
Andropov.24 Dissident and physicist Yuri Orlov recalled that in 1968 he “did not 
                                                 
21 Vladimir V. Kusin, From Dubcek to Charter 77: A Study of ‘Normalization’ in Czechoslovakia, 
1968-1978, (New York, 1978), 9, 13, 28, 69, 73-75. 
22 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to 
Reagan (Washington DC, 1994), 544. 
23 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 240. 
24 Andropov on Surveillance of Soviet Youth, November 1968, Hanhimäki and Westad eds, The 
Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. (Oxford, 2004), 474. 
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encounter a single individual among my enormous number of acquaintances who 
was not excited” by the Czech’s idea of transforming Soviet-style socialism into 
socialism with a human face. However, in Russia “ordinary people cursed the 
ungrateful Czechs for forgetting that the Soviet army had saved them from the 
Nazis.”25 
Although Soviet leaders worried less about intellectual currents within in 
the USSR as they did about those in Czechoslovakia, the late 1960s also saw an 
increase in dissent in the USSR. The dissident movement that emerged in the mid 
1960s became prominent in 1968 when the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current 
Events appeared, the first issue of which featured the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights.26 In the same year, Andrei Sakharov, who had received the Hero of 
Socialist Labor award for his leading work on the hydrogen bomb, first came into 
serious conflict with the regime after the underground publishing of his essay 
“Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom,” which 
was subsequently reprinted worldwide.27 In addition, rising Jewish and Zionist 
consciousness, bolstered by Israel’s decisive victory in the Six Day War of 1967, 
inspired a number of Soviet Jews to oppose the regime that typically regarded 
them as bottom-rung citizens.28 Many of them would become known as 
“refuseniks” after the Soviet Union refused them permission to emigrate, and a 
                                                 
25 Yuri Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts: Memoirs of a Russian Life (New York, 1991), 152. 
26 Samizdat referred to works “self-published” without legal sanction. Savranskaya, “Human 
Rights Movement in the USSR,” 29. 
27 Sakharov had earlier made private appeals to officials on behalf of dissidents and engaged in 
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few would later become prominent members of human rights groups. Many 
Soviet dissidents, who saw the Prague Spring reflecting their advocacy for a more 
humane socialism against Brezhnev’s Stalinist direction in domestic policy, cried 
out against the invasion of Czechoslovakia.29   
From Brezhnev’s viewpoint in the early 1970s, taking the initiative in 
convening a European security conference could help the Soviets recover their 
prestige and following as the self-proclaimed leaders of the international working 
class in the climate of dissent and disillusionment of 1968. Indeed, taking a 
leading role in the establishment of peace and security in Europe would allow him 
to present Soviet power in a positive light. Moreover, bringing the Warsaw Pact 
regimes to a conference of European states was a way to legitimize them as 
socialist partners, and their participation in a conference with Western states made 
them appear as more legitimate members of the international community. Leaders 
of Warsaw Pact countries often did have their own interests in mind at the CSCE, 
including the desire to reduce their economic dependence on Moscow, but they 
generally aligned their CSCE policy with that of the Soviet Union.30 
Paradoxically, Brezhnev’s success in Czechoslovakia allowed him more freedom 
to pursue his personal goals of détente because it strengthened his control of the 
party leadership. On March 17, 1969, the Warsaw Pact issued a renewed call for a 
European security conference. The Soviets had previously proposed a European 
security conference as early as 1954, but their 1969 pronouncement was the first 
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time they invited the US as a participant and did not demand the dissolution of 
NATO.31 
To the Kremlin, CSCE efforts were part of a strategy for making gains in 
the Cold War political contest through peaceful means. It is certainly not giving 
Brezhnev too much credit to acknowledge that the experience of the Second 
World War impacted him and the thought of nuclear war horrified him, but to 
Brezhnev and many other Soviet leaders the efficacy of peace was tied to Soviet 
power. They saw themselves as pursuing an active policy of peace, with Soviet 
arms providing a check on Western aggression.32 Détente rested on the 
acknowledgement that relaxation of tensions did not mean agreement. As 
Shevardnadze put it, Soviet old thinking regarded “peaceful co-existence as a 
specific form of class warfare.”33 Brezhnev explicitly stated this in his 1972 
speech commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR. He announced that 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had always assumed and would 
continue to assume that the “class struggle” between the capitalist and socialist 
systems in the economic, political, and ideological domains would continue 
because “the world outlook and the class aims of socialism and capitalism are 
opposite and irreconcilable.” However, the Soviet Union would “strive to shift 
this historically inevitable struggle onto a path free from the perils of war, of 
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dangerous conflicts, and an uncontrolled arms race.”34 Soviet leaders sought to 
advance their international position in ways they believed would be unlikely to 
cause war between the superpowers. To this end, they hoped the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe would establish a framework for the 
advancement of socialism by peaceful means, and would itself be a forum for 
diplomatic struggle between East and West.  
 Though the advancement of the Communist position was one purpose for 
the CSCE, the Soviets saw Western recognition of the legitimacy of Communist 
governments as a crucial step in normalizing relations between East and West. 
Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin discussed concerns 
over the Nixon administration’s view of Eastern borders and frontiers with 
Kissinger in early 1970. Kissinger assured Dobrynin that President Nixon viewed 
existing borders as “immutable” but would not publically state this position 
regarding the German division.35 While earlier European security conference 
proposals by the Communist bloc had sought to isolate the United States by 
keeping them out of the conference, by the 1970s the Soviets actively pressed the 
United States to get involved. Unlike political leaders in Western Europe, Nixon 
and Kissinger were not interested in the conference that they saw little to gain 
from, and they did little to bring it to fruition. After repeated pleas from the Soviet 
government, Kissinger began taking a more active role, but continued to deride 
the conference. In a 1974 discussion with diplomats from the Netherlands, he 
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declared that “We don’t care about CSCE. We were against the conference in the 
first place.” He only cared that the conference did “not do any damage.”36 To the 
Soviets, the CSCE would play a major role in the normalization of foreign 
relations and the relaxation of tensions between them and the Western capitalist 
countries.  
While the Eastern bloc did have economic motivations for pursuing and 
agreeing to the Final Act, economic motivations appear to be less important than 
political concerns. Economic benefits should not be considered a tradeoff because 
the Western Europeans also desired more economic exchange, and economic 
planks were not subject to major disputes in the CSCE negotiations. Dobrynin 
wrote that by the time of the twenty-fourth party congress in 1971 the party 
establishment, facing a stagnant economy, the emergence of dissidents, and the 
growth of discontent among the educated classes, began to “realize the need to 
satisfy the population’s basic requirements more fully and to narrow the gap with 
the West.” Soviet officials would not pursue political or economic liberalization, 
but “the realities of the rest of the world and the strains on our economy prompted 
the Soviet leadership to improve relations with the nations of Europe and the 
United States.”37  They hoped that normalization of relations would benefit the 
Communist countries by facilitating economic exchanges. However, the CSCE 
did not establish a particular trade regime and trade agreements would differ 
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among the signatories. Trade arrangements between the Soviet Union and the 
United States were restricted by the United States passage of the Jackson-Vanik 
amendment, attached to a December 1974 trade bill, which made improved trade 
relations with the Soviet Union contingent on the Kremlin’s Jewish emigration 
policy.38 However, trade agreements were not subject to major disputes in the 
CSCE. Western European governments tended to look favorably upon improved 
trade relations with the East and viewed wider economic exchange as one of their 
goals for the Conference.39 The Soviets could have improved trade relations in 
agreements without the CSCE, but the CSCE streamlined the process. Trade 
relations with the United States continued to suffer, but trade with Western 
Europe grew, as a result of politics within the Western countries. 
 As much as they worried about American intentions, the Communist bloc 
leaders also worried about West German territorial ambitions and hoped to 
diplomatically block them. Throughout the 1960s, the Soviet and East German 
governments decried “revanchism” among the West Germans.40 These worries 
were not entirely without basis. Chancellor Willy Brandt recalled that when he 
met with East German representative Willi Stoph in 1970, “several thousand 
Nazis – and others who acted like Nazis – had assembled in a protest 
demonstration,” some bearing sings calling for the execution of Brandt. The 
crowds attacked the car that the two men were travelling in and youths took down 
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the East German flag at the hotel where the proceedings were held. These events 
were undoubtedly reported to East Berlin and Moscow.41 
 The Soviet leaders’ concern with West Germany and their view of the 
CSCE’s effects on the diplomatic contest is shown by actions they took shortly 
after Helsinki. On October 7, 1975, the Soviets signed the Treaty of Friendship, 
Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the German Democratic Republic. The treaty’s preamble contained 
a passage reaffirming the “internationalist duty of the socialist countries” to 
uphold, consolidate and defend “socialist gains,” along with promises to 
strengthen peace and security in Europe based on mutually beneficial co-
operation between states with different social systems. Article eight of the treaty 
promised that if one of the parties was subject to armed attack “the other High 
Contracting Party will regard this as an attack upon itself and will immediately 
render it every assistance.” In effect, a renewed military alliance was signed by 
East Germany and the Soviet Union little more than two months after the 
concluding peace settlement of the Second World War, a settlement that was 
supposed to officially mark the establishment of peaceful cooperation as the basis 
of diplomacy in Europe. 42 While the Treaty of Friendship does serve to clarify the 
basis of relations between East Germany and the Soviet Union, it makes sense to 
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view it as the next step in Communist diplomatic maneuvering in the waging of 
international “class struggle” by peaceful means, and partly as a response to the 
threat of renewed outside influence.  
 Articles six and seven of the Treaty of Friendship make it clear that the 
Treaty is aimed at West Germany. Article six begins by proclaiming that “The 
High Contracting Parties regard the inviolability of the frontiers in Europe as the 
paramount requirement for safeguarding European security.” The frontiers 
between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany 
are mentioned specifically, and the parties promise to “exert joint efforts to 
counter any manifestations of revanchism or militarism and will work for strict 
compliance with the treaties concluded to strengthen European security.” Article 
seven reaffirmed that ties with West Berlin would be based on “the fact that it is 
not a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and will continue not to 
be governed by it.”43 Essentially, the treaty used the language and principles of 
Basket I to attempt to contain West Germany and imply that West Berlin fell 
within the inviolable borders of East Germany. This was consistent with the 
strategy discussed in a 1970 policy analysis by the GDR Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which considered it “an essential task” to establish judicial and political 
settlements that reduced the “room of maneuver for West German imperialism.”44 
The Treaty of Friendship was not only about the Soviet Union reaffirming its 
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commitment to East Germany, but it was also an attempt to advance the 
Communist position by diplomatic means. 
The treaty also established a renewed cohesion of the Communist bloc in 
the face of increased contact with the West that the Final Act promised. It 
underscored the importance of strengthening state ideology against outside 
influences. The parties would “concert their efforts to make effective use of the 
material and spiritual potential of their peoples and states for the purposes of 
building a socialist and communist society and strengthening the socialist 
community.” The treaty called for the promotion of “co-operation between their 
organs of state power and between their social organizations” and encouraged the 
development of contacts between the people of the two countries.45 These clauses 
should be seen as responses to the threat of increased openness, an expression of 
resisting the “anti-socialist effects intended by the imperialist states” through 
“increased coordination and cooperation” in the Eastern bloc.46 They were part of 
the Communist efforts to mitigate the potential damage caused by the parts of the 
Final Act that were undesirable to the Communist leadership, consistent with the 
view that the Western initiatives in the Final Act were threats that Communist 
parties were capable of dealing with.  
The Western reaction to the Treaty of Friendship was unsurprised and 
undeterred. West German Federal Minister Franke stated bluntly that “this treaty 
                                                 
45 Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the German Democratic Republic, Documents on Germany, 1297-1300. 
46 Attitudes and Measures of the Warsaw Treaty States, CWIHP.  
30 
 
was to be expected and is consonant with the policies of these two states,” but that 
it could not change the current legal situation.47 The governments of France, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States issued an official statement one week 
later declaring that “no treaty concluded by any of the Four Powers with a third 
state can in any way affect the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers,” and 
therefore the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers were unaffected by the 
Treaty of Friendship.48 A December 1976 policy statement by West German 
Chancellor Schmidt on relations between the German states called for continued 
improvement in relations while insisting that their Germany policy was “free from 
illusions.” Schmidt declared that “Everyone knows that the aim of our policy is to 
work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its 
unity through free self-determination,” and acknowledged that “the GDR 
leadership pursues as its long-term goal the replacement, the defeat, of our 
political system.”49 The Western allies would meet the Soviet diplomatic 
challenge, and they continued to hold onto West Berlin. It was accepted that the 
Final Act established a new, less dangerous setting for each side to pursue their 
foreign policy goals, though complaints and accusations would continue. 
 The Conference thus presented opportunities to generally enhance the 
international position and prestige of the Soviet Union in a way that bilateral 
                                                 
47 Statement by Federal Minister Franke on the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and 
Cooperation Between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, October 7, 1975, 
Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, 1300-1301. 
48 Declaration of the Ambassadors of the Three Western Powers Regarding the Treaty of 
Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation Between the U.S.S.R. and the German 
Democratic Republic. ibid., 1301. 
49 Report by Chancellor Schmidt on Relations Between the Two German States, December 16, 
1976, ibid., 1304-1306. 
31 
 
agreements and recognitions could not. After the March, 1969 Warsaw Pact call 
for a conference, NATO in December endorsed the idea of holding a conference, 
and Multilateral Preparatory Talks began on November 22, 1972.50 According to 
Brezhnev, the Conference, “for which the socialist countries have worked for 
many years, should open a new chapter in European history.”51 The Warsaw Pact 
was taking the initiative in foreign affairs and presenting itself as the leading 
advocate for international peace. Internationalism was an important element in the 
founding mythos of the Soviet Union. In his speeches Brezhnev hailed the 
wisdom of Lenin’s vision of the peaceful coexistence of states with different 
social systems. He presented the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the 
leader of an international working class movement.  
Communist ideology was an important factor in Soviet decision-making as 
it formed the context through which Soviet leaders assessed state interests. 
Melvyn Leffler noted that “The leaders of the Kremlin were interested primarily 
in the power of their state and the survival of their regime, but any account that 
trivializes their faith in the superiority of their system or that obfuscates their 
conviction that they were engaged in a long-term systemic struggle misses an 
important part of their belief system.”52 Soviet leaders’ perception of the threats 
their country faced and the advances they made was shaped by their Communist 
ideology. By the 1970s Soviet ideology was not only competing against Western 
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capitalists and social democrats, but also against Maoism and anti-Soviet 
European Communist parties to be the international leader of the working class. 
By proposing the conference and then actively pushing for American 
involvement, Soviet leaders took the initiative in foreign relations and hoped to 
set peace on their terms. They took a step in reestablishing Europe as the primary 
theater of East-West confrontation, and hoped that by resolving tensions in 
Europe the Soviet Union would become more integrated into European politics. It 
was, to use the 1970 phrasing of the GDR, an ideological offensive that would 
increase the international magnetism of Soviet communism and exploit divisions 
among the capitalist states.53  
 West European leaders met the challenge of a diplomatic contest with the 
Communist bloc by tenaciously arguing that provisions concerning human rights 
and the peaceful change of borders must be included in the Act. In addition to 
their desire to ease tensions and open up trade opportunities with the East, they 
also sought to establish the norms that at least in principle would define European 
identity. To members of the European Community, this meant some recognition 
of human rights as a basis for legitimacy.54 They also saw greater openness as a 
way of establishing a more secure situation in Europe by fostering trust and 
understanding between different peoples. The West Germans argued for language 
allowing for peaceful change of frontiers in accordance with international law. 
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Although at times it may have seemed that the largely cohesive Eastern bloc had 
managed to set the Western allies against each other, the various positions held by 
West European countries meant that the Soviets would have to deal with 
numerous proposals and try to compromise with those least offensive to them. 
The West European approach to the conference took the diplomatic initiative 
away from the Soviet Union by proposing numerous principles to attach to 
peaceful coexistence. The Communist bloc had long proposed a European 
conference, and had just renewed their call for a conference, positioning 
themselves to the Eastern public and to the world as the leaders in international 
peace. For the Soviets to back out later, especially when it would have been clear 
they backed out over issues of human rights, free movement, and free exchange of 
information, would have been a defeat in the contest for international legitimacy.  
 The pursuit of competing concepts of European security and cooperation 
resulted in lengthy debate and revision interrupted by periods of stalling. The 
process was exacerbated by the fact that the Final Act would be issued in multiple 
languages, and delegates argued when translations used words that implied 
greater or less strictness or specificity. Principle 7, a series of statements on 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, required more sessions than 
any of the other principles and took three months to negotiate. Even more difficult 
were the Basket III negotiations, which lasted from March 1973 to June 1975.55 
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In general, as negotiations wore on, the drafters made language less 
specific, such as when they dropped “free movement of ideas” and adopted 
“Cooperation in Humanitarian and other fields.”56 The insistence on including 
provisions for the peaceful change of frontiers, which was especially of interest to 
the West German delegation, was a major stumbling block. Brezhnev wanted the 
inviolability of borders to be the principle that stood above everything else, but 
the West Germans insisted that inviolability of borders be linked to the possibility 
of peaceful change. The placement of this clause in the document and even the 
punctuation of the clause became major sticking points.57 The final outcome was 
to place the offending sentence within the first principle in the section Questions 
Relating to Security in Europe.  It read “They consider that their frontiers can be 
changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by 
agreement.” Inviolability of frontiers was itself enumerated as Principle III.58 
Participants in the CSCE process, unlike Kissinger, took the language of the Act 
very seriously. 
 The Soviet leadership used a major conference because the attention it 
would garner most effectively achieved their goals of advancing their European 
diplomatic position and their international legitimacy while achieving a climactic 
conclusion to the Second World War. The spectacle of the conference made the 
long-delayed conclusion to the Second World War more climactic than it would 
                                                 
56 Thomas, The Helsinki Effect, 60. 
57 Memorandum of Conversation, December 15, 1974, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. 39, Doc 254. 




have been with minor, gradual recognitions, and enhanced the prestige of the 
regime for which the War was a defining national moment. Brezhnev “could 
easily assess the potential publicity he would gain - above all, in his own country - 
when the Soviet public learned of the final settlement of the postwar boundaries 
for which they had sacrificed so much.”59 If the goal was only to make 
agreements between national leaders, this could have been achieved through the 
continuation of bilateral and multilateral negotiations that were increasing 
diplomatic recognition and stability while the Conference was still being put 
together.60 Taking a leading role in the CSCE meant the Soviets were taking on a 
leading role in Europe and showing to the world their initiative as internationalists 
and peacemakers. Brezhnev did not want to hide behind an iron curtain, but 
wanted to charm his way onto the world stage as a great statesman leading the 
international working class.  
What the Communist participants in the CSCE traded for official 
recognition and the improvement of their international situation was the formal 
acceptance of West European human rights norms and greater openness to 
Western influence. They believed that this was a threat that they were well-
equipped to deal with. As described above, the Treaty of Friendship contained an 
example of tightening the Eastern bloc to better ensure the success of Soviet 
socialism. Brezhnev’s speech to the CSCE on the eve of the signing of the Final 
Act showed the Soviet perception. It included the obligatory insistence that Lenin, 
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whom Brezhnev reminded the audience was the founder of the Soviet state, 
“fought with such conviction and consistency” for peaceful coexistence, a cause 
“for which our people are fighting to this day.”61 The “main conclusion” the Final 
Act presented to the future “is this: no one should try, from foreign policy 
considerations of one kind or another, to dictate to other peoples how they should 
manage their internal affairs.”62 This conclusion was supported by the United 
States. In a March 1975 letter to President Ford, Brezhnev noted his satisfaction 
in seeing a letter from Ford “justly state that inviolability of frontiers is the key 
element in ensuring security and cooperation in Europe.” Brezhnev hailed this 
“clear reaffirmation” by the President of the United States “that the US accepts 
without qualification the frontiers and territorial integrity of all European 
states.”63 The Soviets held that the Final Act was a matter of securing peaceful 
coexistence by recognizing the borders of Eastern Europe, a major step forward in 
the campaign for peace initiated by the Communist bloc following Lenin’s course. 
Soviet success in achieving peace was supposed to not only safeguard the 
revolutions that the Communist party had already brought to fruition, but also to 
make Soviet socialism more attractive to the international working class. 
 The Soviet leadership believed that they could ensure the Final Act would 
be perceived as they wanted it to be, at least in their sphere of influence. Gromyko 
argued that the recognition of postwar boundaries would be a major political and 
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propaganda victory, and the Basket II clauses would open up economic 
opportunities. He insisted that implementing the human rights commitments was 
up to the Soviet government, which was technically true as the Final Act was not 
legally binding. “We are masters in our own house,” he assured the Politburo. 
Brezhnev supported Gromyko, believing that the human rights elements of the 
Act could be downplayed with the help of the Party’s control of the press.64 
Ironically, news media in the United States generally reflected the view that 
Brezhnev won in Helsinki, and both the New York Times and the Wall Street 
Journal blasted the Ford administration for its acceptance of Soviet hegemony in 
Eastern Europe.65 This brings up the interesting speculative question of whether 
the Soviets would have agreed to the Final Act had the United States been more 
insistent on the issue of human rights. While the US probably could have derailed 
the Conference by taking a belligerent posture, it is possible that if the American 
delegation took an active, businesslike role like that of the West Europeans they 
could have made the CSCE process more effective and acceptable to the 
American public. In any case, more stable and open relations prevailed in Europe, 
and the Soviet Union accepted in principle that political legitimacy was based on 
respecting certain fundamental rights. Soviet leaders did not think this principle 
was much of a threat to their power and believed they had come out ahead in a 
difficult contest with the West. 
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The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was a forum for 
the power struggles of international diplomacy. It was not a friendly summit but a 
peace settlement between acknowledged rivals where each side tried to secure 
peace on the most favorable terms possible. The Soviet goal of advancing their 
version of socialism through peaceful struggle was challenged by the Western 
European powers and their view of what was required for membership in the 
community of Europe. The CSCE showed the potential of détente not as surrender 
or mere acceptance of the political status quo, but as the pursuit of the 
international rivalry in an atmosphere of relaxing tensions. The CSCE also 
provided a venue for Western Europeans to assert what it meant to belong to 
Europe, in the face of one superpower and generally without the help of the other. 
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was part of an active 
process of changing the political situation in Europe by moving away from Cold 
War confrontation. Through transnational activism and the follow-up conferences 
called for in the Final Act, the CSCE would continue to affect the ideological 









From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985  
 
The Soviet victory did not last long. The Soviet Union failed to establish 
its concept of the Helsinki Final Act at home or abroad. In fact, European détente 
“prompted and accelerated a set of challenges ‘from below’ that transformed the 
East-West relationship.”66 Dissident activity in the Soviet Union increased and 
greater transnational contact between activists, reporters, and government officials 
increased pressure on the USSR. While repression and propaganda isolated the 
dissident movement, Soviet leaders were unable to present a positive program 
against the human rights ideals championed by the West and resorted to obstinacy 
in international relations by stonewalling in discussions of human rights and 
behaving defensively. With the Soviet Union on the defensive, CSCE Follow-Up 
Meetings provided a venue where the West could challenge the USSR and, in 
1983, win further concessions on human rights. Nevertheless, the situation for 
dissidents, who faced more intimidation, arrests, and harsh sentences, as well as 
the prestige of the Soviet regime, deteriorated until Mikhail Gorbachev acceded to 
the post of General Secretary nearly ten years after the signing of the Final Act. 
 Immediately after the signing of the Accords, things seemed to be under 
control for Soviet leaders. They made minor improvements in compliance with 
Basket III in the fall of 1975, somewhat easing restrictions on Western journalists 
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and sales on Western newspapers.67 While exit visa fees were lowered, fewer 
were issued in 1975, allowing the Soviets to point to superficial progress without 
making real concessions.68 The Soviets also complained to the US that Western 
radio broadcasting into the Soviet Union was against the spirit of détente, and 
urged the US to relax restrictions on entry visas.69 At first the Soviet Union was 
able to use the Final Act to its advantage. 
Soon however, the Soviet Union found itself on the defensive when it 
came to human rights.  The first blow was struck by dissidents within the USSR. 
As Anatoly Dobrynin described, “The condition of Soviet dissidents certainly did 
not change overnight, but they were definitely encouraged by this historic 
document.”70 The passage of the Final Act did not turn things around 180 degrees 
for the dissident movement, but it did spark an era of heightened interest and 
attention. At first glance there appears to be continuity in the dissident movement 
before and after Helsinki. Organizations in defense of human rights had existed in 
the USSR before the convening of CSCE. A Committee for Defense of Human 
Rights was established in 1970 by Valery Chalidze, which included Sakharov 
among its members.71 The KGB reported that in 1975 “10,206 anti-Soviet, 
ideologically harmful and slanderous anonymous documents were prepared and 
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distributed by 1,629 authors,” In addition, the KGB uncovered “53 hostile 
nationalistic and anti-social groups with 182 participants.” Even more had 
allegedly been uncovered in 1974, a year before the Act was signed72 Already in 
1971 there was an emphasis on human rights and transnational contact with 
Sakharov as a focal point of activity and communication. A KGB report from 
1971 decries Sakharov’s contacts with West and the use of Western broadcasts to 
boost publicity for the “so-called” Human Rights Committee, warns of a stream 
of letters to Sakharov and the committee offering support and complaints about 
officials, and describes Sakharov’s apartment as becoming a place of pilgrimage 
for people who have trouble with the regime. Some citizens allegedly came from 
remote regions of the country to Moscow specifically to meet him.73  
 By the early 1970s the KGB had developed a particularly effective system 
of crackdowns on dissent. It relied not only on the time-tested methods of 
infiltration and informers but on a more systematized kind of intimidation, 
referred to as “prophylactic work,” and the increased use of pseudo-psychiatry to 
denigrate, isolate, and sometimes mentally torture determined dissenters.74  The 
KGB reported that in 1975, they subjected about 20,000 people who committed 
“politically harmful actions that did not contain a criminal intent,” to prophylactic 
work, had over 25 dissidents, including Zionists, exiled from the country, and 
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subjected 486 people to criminal punishment for political activity.75 One must be 
careful, however, when relying on reports from the KGB to the political 
authorities. Yuri Andropov, who became KGB director in 1967, was not above 
exaggerating, as the experience of Czechoslovakia shows. Unfortunately, internal 
KGB reports are harder to access. However, even if reports were distorted to 
create a sense of alarm, KGB reports clearly show that the highest authorities 
were concerned with the dissident movement. 
 In addition to dissidents, the KGB was also concerned about refuseniks, 
some of whom would become prominent human rights activists. Refuseniks lived 
a precarious existence as their applications for exit visas typically caused them to 
lose their jobs and become bigger targets for anti-Semitic abuse. While refuseniks 
and dissidents were distinct groups, the lines were often blurred, exemplified by 
the case of Anatoly Shcharansky. Shcharansky had tried to emigrate in 1973 and 
soon became involved in Jewish cultural life. Like many Jews, his application was 
not approved. He then put his good English to work communicating with the West 
and serving as Sakharov’s interpreter, and later helped found the Moscow 
Helsinki Group. His public participation in the Group brought greater attention to 
the plight of Soviet Jews and his subsequent imprisonment became a major 
rallying call for human rights activists and Jewish advocates.76 
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Despite a superficial appearance of continuity in dissident life, the CSCE 
process did support an increase in dissident activity and attention given to it. By 
1973 the Conference was already underway, and Soviet leaders were greatly 
concerned with relations with the West. Concern with the CSCE appears to be 
referred to when the KGB warns that Sakharov “persistently appeals to the West 
not to embark on the course of rapprochement with the USSR without ‘extracting 
from Soviet leadership concessions’ of an ideological and political nature.” 
Through contacts in Western media Sakharov encouraged the West to not give the 
Soviets what they wanted unless they agreed to improved human rights standards. 
The KGB warned that punitive measures against Sakharov would “lead to 
vigorous anti-Soviet outcries in the West, and may be met with less than full 
understanding by some fraternal parties.”  It would also require “additional 
explanations inside the country.” 77  The international spotlight of the CSCE was 
troublesome for Soviet authorities. Shortly before signing the Final Act, they 
expressed concern that Sakharov would damage their prestige. With his 
“distinctly provocative behavior” he hoped “either to press his point with the help 
of the world community or to damage the prestige of the Soviet state on the eve of 
the European conference.”78 Soviet internal behavior became more dependent on 
foreign relations as the CSCE put more attention on their failures to maintain 
international human rights standards. 
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Sakharov himself perceived the importance of the CSCE and acted 
accordingly. The KGB noted that by December 1975, when Sakharov met with 
foreign journalists he “continually expressed the idea” that the Helsinki 
conference presented opportunities for exerting pressure on the USSR. He told a 
British journalist, “It is now very important to increase the pressure of the world 
public opinion in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union…after the Helsinki 
conference and after the award of the [Nobel] Peace Prize to me, I hope better 
conditions have been created for such activity.” Sakharov explained that “the task 
of the West is to use the tools it has at hand to assist the Soviet Union in fulfilling 
its obligations.”79  
 Additionally, increased media attention owing to the CSCE changed how 
the dissident movement operated. Much more international attention was paid to 
the dissidents, and Soviet citizens could learn about them from foreign broadcasts. 
One dissident wrote that the situation changed so dramatically that he no longer 
had to find ways to interest the press in statements by refuseniks or dissidents, as 
now “the correspondents literally tore them out of my hands.”80 Space was 
opened up for dissent as a result of the Soviet Union’s conflicting commitment 
between internal domination and good appearances required for effective foreign 
policy. 
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 The Final Act served as a unifying platform and legitimizing document for 
dissidents in the USSR, made more potent by the fact that they were championing 
a document carrying Leonid Brezhnev’s signature. Activists within the USSR 
soon established groups that based their platform on Helsinki principles.81 The 
Act served to forge “a common ideological basis” between a variety of 
oppositional groups, including religious freedom activists.82 Human rights 
activists used the Final Act as their own set of principles. On May 13, 1976, Yuri 
Orlov founded The Public Group to Support Compliance with the Helsinki 
Accords in the USSR, often referred to as the Moscow Helsinki Group, in 
Moscow.83  
Yuri Orlov was no stranger to trouble. In the wake of Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin, Orlov got on the authorities’ bad side for a speech he 
delivered, a major theme of which was democracy on a foundation of socialism.84 
After the “Czech tragedy” he felt he “had to do something,” and contacted the 
Moscow dissidents. He met Sakharov in 1973 and shortly afterward got involved 
in the founding of the Soviet Amnesty International Group. After being fired from 
the scientific institute, he sent a protest letter to the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
as well as to foreign correspondents because “without pressure from abroad any 
internal protest was useless.”85 
                                                 
81 Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War, 66. 
82 Savranskaya, “Human Rights Movement in the USSR,” 31. 
83 Snyder, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War, 57. 
84 Orlov, Dangerous Thoughts, 119. 
85 Ibid., 156, 161, 168, 170. 
46 
 
The Moscow Helsinki Group immediately went to work providing 
documentation to Western governments, while foreign radio broadcasts raised 
awareness of the group and encouraged more Soviet citizens to appeal to 
international organizations in defense of their rights. Orlov considered nearly all 
the original members of the Moscow Helsinki Group to be “veterans” of the 
human rights movement. He viewed the purpose of the group as changing what he 
called the “Munich” approach of the West to détente. According to Orlov, “all the 
democratic dissidents understood that only democratization of the USSR…could 
ensure mutual security.” 86 The effectiveness of Helsinki commitments needed to 
be nurtured by the dissident effect on Helsinki implementation. It gave the Act 
grassroots meaning beyond international posturing.  
While Sakharov supported the Moscow Helsinki Group, he preferred 
operating independently to his previous experience with political groups. He 
would sign documents that he agreed with and assist group members. Sakharov’s 
wife, Elena Bonner, joined the group and became one of its most active members. 
Though Sakharov had expressed anti-regime ideas independently, Bonner became 
an important influence and partner after the two activists met in 1970. Soviet 
authorities would unsuccessfully attempt to split the dynamic couple by creating 
and spreading rumors, which they may have partially believed, that Bonner was 
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unfaithful, unstable, and greedy, or that she was an agent of international Zionism 
poisoning Sakharov’s mind.87  
Shortly before founding the Moscow Helsinki Group, Orlov had met 
Millicent Fenwick, a recently elected US Congresswoman traveling as part of an 
official delegation to the USSR. He suggested to her that the West should use the 
Helsinki Accords to pressure the Soviet government to honor its human rights 
commitments and monitor compliance. Fenwick’s numerous meetings with Soviet 
dissidents and refuseniks, which she described as “heartbreaking,” encouraged her 
to initiate legislation to create the Commission on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, a joint congressional-executive body to monitor compliance with the 
Final Act. The Commission was established with Ford’s signature on June 3, 
1976. Under the active leadership of Congressman Dante Fascell, the Commission 
established compliance with the Final Act as a concern of the US government. 
The Soviets opposed the establishment of the Commission on the grounds that it 
was interfering in internal Soviet affairs and its emphasis on Basket III was not in 
line with the CSCE principle that all baskets were equally important.88 Fenwick 
had been involved in the civil rights movement prior to entering elected office, 
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and would later consider the Commission on Human Rights to be the most 
important part of her congressional career.89  
 The United States government soon took the offensive on human rights, 
rather than downplaying human rights concerns as the Nixon and Ford 
administrations had. Typically the language of the Final Act would be used and its 
commitments would be referred to. The increase in Soviet dissident activity 
coincided with changing attitudes toward the Final Act and a new presidential 
administration in the United States. Sakharov appealed to the Final Act in letters 
to Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter during the 1976 presidential campaign, arguing 
that human rights were inseparable from problems of international peace or 
economic progress. He also stated that the Helsinki agreement “opens new 
opportunities for international initiatives, such as, for example, the struggle for a 
general worldwide amnesty of political prisoners.” 90 The Carter administration 
took up the task of pushing hard for Helsinki compliance. While Carter had 
initially opposed the signing of the Final Act, during his campaign he began to see 
it as a useful tool in challenging the Soviet Union’s human rights record. Shortly 
after taking office, Carter pressed Brezhnev to comply with the Helsinki accords, 
“We expect cooperation in the realization of further steps toward the fulfillment 
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of the agreements reached in Helsinki relating to human rights.” He invited 
“personal, confidential exchanges of views on these delicate questions.”91 
Human rights were central to Carter’s foreign policy agenda. In his 
inaugural address, which he drafted himself, he proclaimed that human rights 
constituted “the new reality of our time” and “because we are free, we can never 
be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”92 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s 
national security advisor, wrote in his memoir that Carter “came to the presidency 
with a determination to make foreign policy more humane and moral.” He 
“deeply believed in human rights and that commitment remained constant during 
his administration.”93 Brzezinski considered one of his primary objectives to 
increase America’s ideological impact on the world, with a heavy emphasis on 
human rights. He believed that the US should “redefine détente into a more 
purposeful and activist policy for the West” and saw in human rights “an 
opportunity to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive.” He viewed 
the USSR as becoming increasingly assertive under détente, and referenced 
statements by Soviet officials like, “the policy of peaceful coexistence has nothing 
in common with the ‘freezing’ of the social status quo, with any artificial 
mothballing of the revolutionary process.”94 Brzezinski credits Carter’s policy 
with establishing human rights as a global concern and having a major impact on 
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US allies to relax repression, including releases of political prisoners in Latin 
America.95 
According to historian Svetlana Savranskaya, Carter’s interest in human 
rights made him “undoubtedly the most respected foreigner among Soviet human 
rights activists.”96 Shortly after Carter’s inauguration, Sakharov wrote to him 
drawing attention to human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and listing a number 
of political prisoners the US should make a priority.97 The administration 
responded with a “carefully worded reply” that nonetheless met condemnation 
from Brezhnev as “correspondence with a renegade who proclaimed himself an 
enemy of the Soviet state.”98 Sakharov wrote years later that Carter’s commitment 
to human rights still appeared to have been “serious and sincere,” and regretted 
only that the Carter administration did not always act on this conviction in the 
most effective manner.99 
The US government was not alone in responding to Soviet dissidents. An 
extensive movement emerged that used the final act as its founding ideology.100 
An important group was the United States Helsinki Watch Committee, which 
maintained contact with Helsinki activists in Eastern and Western Europe, 
publicized failures to comply with the Final Act, and compiled reports that could 
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be used in negotiation. Helsinki Watch proclaimed its mission as “monitoring US 
compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords and 
monitoring the freedom of others to do the same in their countries.” Its first 
annual report raised issues of discrimination, civil liberties abuses, and rights of 
untried prisoners in the United States and describes harsh repression in the Soviet 
bloc.101 Sometimes Helsinki Watch and similar groups could more effectively 
exert pressure in individual cases than states could, as image-conscious 
governments that would stand firm in the face of pressure from an adversary 
might otherwise be amenable to public opinion.102 
 While Helsinki Watch often worked with the US government, providing 
information and advice, its reports suggest that human rights groups were 
independent actors with interests that did not always align with the governments 
they worked with. Helsinki Watch’s 1983 report noted that during the Carter 
administration and the early years of the Reagan administration, the organization 
enjoyed good relations with the State Department and its bureau of human rights 
because their emphasis on human rights violations in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe suited US foreign policy objectives. Cooperation decreased when 
Helsinki Watch raised concerns of human rights violations in non-aligned 
Yugoslavia, and when Helsinki Watch addressed human rights problems in 
Turkey, it “came into direct conflict with the State Department.” Turkey was an 
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important NATO member and a major recipient of US aid. The State Department 
maintained that Turkey was in a transition to democracy, and Helsinki Watch was 
unable to gain much support in Congress for condemning Turkey’s human rights 
practices. Helsinki Watch charged that “the Reagan Administration’s selective 
human rights policy has destroyed its credibility in the West and its effectiveness 
in promoting human rights in the Eastern bloc countries,” and cooperated with 
Americas Watch and the Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights to 
publish a report “Failure: the Reagan Administration’s Human Rights Policy in 
1983.”103 A later report on the Reagan administration’s human rights record 
“found that the Administration was vigorous in denouncing abuses in countries 
aligned with the Soviet Union or considered hostile to the US, but that these 
denunciations were not part of an even-handed effort to promote human rights 
worldwide, and were thus not as effective as they could have been.”104 The CSCE 
inspired a flowering of non-government groups taking responsibility for 
advocating Soviet human rights improvement. As these groups were independent 
actors, they did not always take the same positions as the governments they 
lobbied and were able to serve as continual institutions for maintaining concern 
on human rights in the CSCE outside of the East-West contest. 
 While Helsinki activists were the most involved in promoting overall 
Helsinki compliance, other private individuals and organizations pressured the 
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Soviet Union’s human rights record, often referencing the Final Act. Scientific 
and professional groups responded to the persecution of their counterparts in the 
USSR by pledging to avoid working with the USSR, which was in need of 
Western technology, until political prisoners were freed.105 Pressure from groups 
of Western psychiatrists on Soviet punitive psychiatry was enough of a concern 
that the KGB organized a campaign to counter it.106 By the 1970s, thousands of 
American Jews had mobilized and marched in support of the rights of Soviet 
Jews.107 French citizens, especially trade unionists, Trotskyists, and the anti-
authoritarian left supported East European oppositionists, including by providing 
clandestine support to Poland’s Solidarity movement.108 Statements by Western 
communist parties broadcast by Western radio into the Soviet Union were 
particularly troubling for Soviet leaders. The KGB recorded Sakharov as saying 
“The position of the Italian communists corresponds to our views and 
opinions.”109 In February 1976, they expressed concerns about the views that 
“Communist party leaders of some capitalist countries hold on the question of 
democracy.”110 Self-proclaimed communists criticizing or denouncing the Soviet 
Union threatened the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s pretensions of being 
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the leader of global proletarian revolution. Helsinki activism took place within a 
broader context of non-government transnational activism for upholding human 
rights in the USSR, and the various currents of activism reinforced each other. 
 Soviet leaders did not respond favorably to pressure over their human 
rights record. They had a different idea of human rights than the views prevailing 
in the West and considered attempts to change their human rights policy to be 
interference in their internal affairs that offended the spirit of détente. A draft 
letter to Dobrynin from the central committee celebrated the Soviet Union’s 
guarantee of “the right for work, education, social security, free medical 
assistance, and retirement to all Soviet citizens” and decried “multi-million 
unemployment, deprivation of rights of ethnic minorities, race discrimination, 
unequal rights for women, the violation of citizens rights by the state organs, the 
persecution of people with progressive convictions” in the West as well as 
“systematic support by the USA of dictatorial, anti-populist regimes in some 
countries.”111 KGB officials reported that human rights activism in the Soviet 
Union was caused by foreign interference. They warned that “the adversary’s 
special and propaganda services” were trying to create the appearance of “a so-
called ‘internal opposition.’” in the USSR. The foreign conspirators allegedly 
provided support for “those inspiring antisocial trends,” and “encouraged bringing 
                                                 




together the participants of various tendencies of anti-Soviet activities.”112 
Communist Party ideology colored the leadership’s perception of rights, their 
perception of failures to uphold rights in the West, and the nature of the threat the 
regime faced from human rights activism. 
 Helsinki activists in the USSR would not escape prosecution for long. 
Yuri Orlov described that they were active for almost nine months while the KGB 
was “busy preparing big cases against us.”113 The KGB maintained that the 
Helsinki groups inflicted “serious political damage on the Soviet state”114 and 
needed to be suppressed. In January 1977 the KGB urged the Central Committee 
of the CPSU to approve arrests. Noting that the Moscow Helsinki group had not 
been deterred by warnings, they emphasized the need to “take more decisive 
measures.” The existence of a threat to the Soviet system was implied by the 
KGB’s argument that punitive measures would influence the situation in 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other allied countries “which are presently being 
subjected to mass pressure from both hostile internal elements and international 
imperialism.115 Orlov was arrested in February 1977 and sent to a brutal labor 
camp after a farcical trial. He remained in the camp until February 1984 when he 
was moved to a remote Siberian village, an improvement he thought was likely 
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due to pressure exerted by Moscow dissidents and Westerners, particularly 
scientists. He was eventually exiled to the United States.116 
 Human rights advocacy complicated East-West relations, but it was far 
from the only reason for the breakdown of détente. Soviet leaders acknowledged 
that the trial of dissidents Anatoly Scharansky and Alexander Ginzburg was a 
major complicating factor in US-Soviet relations.117 Brzezinski recalled that 
Soviet imprisonment of human rights activists hurt Soviet relations with Carter. 
The trial of Shcharansky and Ginzburg, “both of whom enjoyed enormous 
popularity” in the US, complicated a technology transfer deal. Ethnic groups, 
especially Jews, tended to favor being hard on the Soviets, but “the business 
community generally opposed any linkage between politics and trade.”118 
However, the superpowers had other concerns as well. When Brezhnev decried 
the “growing aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter government” at a 1978 
Politburo meeting, he mentioned “attempts at clumsy interference in our internal 
affairs,” but most of his concerns revolved around the arms race and US relations 
with their rival China.119 Many of the concerns the leaders of the superpowers 
expressed to each other revolved around questions of armaments and 
interventions or deployments of forces around the globe.120 Human rights 
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differences were one element of East-West conflict that reduced trust between the 
superpowers within a broader ideological and geopolitical contest. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, CSCE Follow-up Meetings were the scenes of 
diplomatic wrangling over the place of human rights in international relations. 
The Final Act contained provisions for periodic follow-up meetings to the 
conference in Helsinki, where delegates would review compliance with Final Act 
provisions and discuss ways to improve inter-European relations. The CSCE was 
a process which after 1975 “had to come up with concrete results in the form of 
commitments which would go beyond previous undertakings” in order to validate 
its continued existence as an institution.121 The focus on the human dimension in 
the CSCE underscored the international concern for human rights and other 
humanitarian issues. It was a shift that put relations between the individual and 
the state on the same diplomatic level as state-to-state relations, “thus raising the 
individual to the pan-European plane.”122 Heraclides characterizes Principle 
Seven as stating “classical absolutes” of human rights while Basket III focused on 
applying these absolutes into narrower, specific, “more modest undertakings.” In 
CSCE follow-up meetings, an emphasis on the “absolutes” of Principle Seven 
corresponded to the absolutist expression of principles by the United States 
delegation, while West Europeans tended to take a more gradualist approach 
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addressing incremental improvements, corresponding to the ideals of Basket 
III.123 
 CSCE follow-ups functioned as forums of East-West confrontation. 
Human rights failures of NATO member Turkey and non-aligned Yugoslavia 
were rarely mentioned by Western delegations, and Romania, the most 
independent member of the Warsaw Pact but hardly the least repressive, generally 
received less criticism from the West than did the Soviet Union or its closer 
allies.124 The US approach to human rights fit Brzezinski’s paradigm of increasing 
the political cost for the Soviets of behavior the US considered harmful, partly 
through “continued insistence on human rights as part of the ideological 
competition.”125 The US delegation to the first follow-up meeting, held in 
Belgrade from October 4, 1977 to March 8 1978, was headed by Arthur Goldberg, 
an experienced lawyer, former Supreme Court justice, secretary of labor, and 
ambassador to the United Nations.126 Goldberg emphatically established human 
rights as a major concern of the CSCE and employed research from Helsinki 
activists to lambast the Soviet Union and its allies for human rights failures, 
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taking an approach that even Western allies sometimes considered overly 
aggressive.127 
Before the next CSCE follow-up meeting, East-West relations were hurt 
by events which drew the iron curtain tighter, making it harder for diplomats and 
dissidents to achieve their goals. On Christmas Eve 1979, six months after after 
Carter and Brezhnev met in Vienna, Soviet military forces entered Afghanistan. 
With Brezhnev’s health in decline, Soviet policy was increasingly under the 
influence of Gromyko, Andropov, and the hawkish defense minister Dmitry 
Ustinov, but Brezhnev ultimately signed off on the strike. Shocked by the brash 
show of force and believing that the Soviets intended to move on the Persian Gulf 
and its oil resources, Carter froze relations with the Soviets, imposed a grain 
embargo, and announced a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. 
Western Europe, though not as immediately or harshly as the US, cooled relations 
with the USSR.128 The heightened mistrust and hostility  
 The United States continued its confrontational approach at the second 
CSCE Follow-up meeting, this time with a delegation headed by Max 
Kampelman. Burdened by heightened Cold War tensions as well as the continuing 
inability to agree on human rights commitments, the Madrid Follow-up Meeting 
lasted from November 1980 to September 1983. Kampelman, with years of 
political involvement behind him, was working privately as a lawyer in 1980 
when Vice President Mondale invited him to head the delegation at Madrid, 
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promising it would only be a few months of service. In a 2003 interview 
Kampelman admitted that at first he did not know what was going on in Madrid. 
After speaking for a bit he realized it was a follow up to the conference attended 
by Arthur Goldberg three years earlier in Belgrade. Despite recalling that 
Goldberg considered it a miserable experience, he agreed to go.129 He viewed his 
mission as the “same kind of fight” as the struggle of “Communism versus 
Democracy” he had experienced in the labor movement and in the Democratic 
Party of Minnesota in the immediate post-war era. The United States, “had to take 
a leadership position” in the role of promoting democracy and human rights.130 
US-Soviet relations did not improve with the election of Ronald Reagan, a 
longtime advocate of tougher relations with the USSR. Reagan, however, was not 
only a staunch Cold Warrior who ratcheted up the arms race and ramped up anti-
Communist rhetoric and interventions, but also an idealist with the conviction that 
a strong America would prevail because its way of life would prove more 
attractive. Unlike many of his advisors he saw value in negotiating with the Soviet 
Union. His June 1982 appointment of George Shultz to replace Alexander Haig as 
Secretary of State began to shift the balance toward cooperation. Though Reagan 
would famously call the Soviet Union an “evil empire” in March of 1983, he 
privately assured Shultz that he supported Shultz’s approach to engaging in 
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constructive dialogue with Soviet leaders.131 Shultz, however, would be given 
little room to act on new ideas until Reagan’s second term.132  
 Kampelman’s ability to work with the Reagan administration 
demonstrated continuity in the US approach to the CSCE from Carter to Reagan, 
which was not entirely expected. Reagan, in a 1976 address, had lambasted the 
Final Act as “putting our stamp of approval on Russia’s enslavement of the 
captive nations.”133 Yet Reagan came to see the Final Act as a useful tool in 
pressuring the Soviets. Kampelman, despite his longtime affiliation with the 
Democratic Party, was kept at his post after Reagan took office in 1981. Reagan’s 
first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig expressed approval for Kampelman’s 
work and encouraged him to continue.134 Kampelman and Reagan did have a 
political affinity; both, for example, were members of the Committee on the 
Present Danger, a bipartisan foreign policy group that supported military buildup 
and taking a hard line against the USSR.135  
In light of the criticism of Reagan’s human rights record by Helsinki 
Watch and others, it would seem plausible to conclude that the Reagan 
administration was hypocritical and only used human rights issues to berate the 
Soviets. Even Dobrynin wrote that neither Reagan nor Haig were especially 
committed to the rights of Soviet dissidents (in contrast to Carter), although they 
                                                 
131 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 351-354. 
132 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 8-9. 
133 Ronald Reagan Attacks Détente, March 31 1976. Hanhimaki and Westad, The Cold War: A 
History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, 534. 
134 Charles Stuart Kennedy Interview with Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, June 24, 2003. 
135 Snyder, Human Rights Activism, 137-138. 
62 
 
would play that card from time to time.136 However, it is likely that the longtime 
investment in anti-Communist ideology led Reagan and many of his advisors to 
believe that Soviet power was a greater threat to freedom than anything that a 
capitalist or non-aligned state would do. Reagan’s focus on the Pentecostal 
Christians trying to flee Soviet persecution and his increasing warmth as political 
prisoners were released suggested that Soviet human rights violations were major 
impediments for him to trust the Soviet Union. Many of his advisors, however, 
remained convinced that the goal of the Soviet Union was global Communist 
domination and the cause of freedom required supporting a lesser evil here and 
there. 
 As the Madrid meeting languished, Kampelman was able to employ quiet 
diplomacy as well as grandstanding condemnation. He had gone to Madrid intent 
on naming names and challenging the Soviet bloc. When West German foreign 
minister Genscher, remembering the experience with Goldberg, expressed 
concern prior to the opening of the meeting, Kampelman told him to think of the 
NATO bloc as an orchestra: “We're going to blow the horn. If you don't want to 
blow the horn, you do it your way. But let's make music together.”137 Kampelman 
was also able to employ quiet diplomacy. Desiring to have more than a statement 
come out of Madrid, Kampelman proposed to President Reagan that he quietly 
push the USSR for the release of political prisoners. The United States would not 
allow the passage of a concluding document for the Madrid meeting unless an 
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acceptable list of political prisoners was released. Reagan approved, and 
suggested a number of Pentecostal Christians taking refuge in the US embassy as 
well as a number of Jewish refuseniks. According to Kampelman, the KGB 
officer at Madrid insisted on secrecy. Kampelman was not to tell anybody about 
the deal they were making except Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz. 
When Kampelman asked if Dobrynin should be informed, he was told, “No, he 
sticks his nose into everything.” After a series of negotiations the US secured the 
release of numerous political prisoners. The Madrid CSCE Follow-Up began the 
US practice of requiring tangible human rights progress, usually the release of 
prisoners, before making concessions to the Soviets.138  
Finally, after a recess from February to November 1982 in protest of the 
imposition of martial law in Poland, and with the cloud of the Soviets’ downing 
of a Korean airliner hanging over the proceedings, the Madrid meeting closed on 
September 9, 1983.139 Kampelman later characterized the meeting as taking 
advantage of an “ought.” With the Final Act asserting the ways countries ought to 
behave, signatories had the right to say, “Move your 'is' to the 'ought'.”140 The 
concluding document signed at Madrid by delegates from the the 35 CSCE states 
supplemented the Final Act with more explicit protocols and expectations for 
human rights and human contacts.141 At the first CSCE Follow-Up, the West, led 
by Goldberg, established human rights compliance as a primary concern of CSCE 
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follow-ups. The Madrid meeting built on this commitment as NATO members 
practiced greater cohesion than they did at Belgrade and secured more explicit 
commitments while quiet diplomacy by the US delegation secured the release of 
political prisoners.  
Transnational activism helped put the Soviet Union on the defensive in 
Madrid even more than was the case in Belgrade. Dozens of NGOs and numerous 
dissidents, human rights activists, and ethnic group representatives attended the 
Madrid conference. Helsinki Watch, active throughout the meeting, held press 
conferences and published editorials, establishing the importance of human rights 
compliance in the public discourse.142 Activists also influenced the Madrid 
meeting by providing the delegations with information on violations. Kampelman 
characterized his approach to the meeting as acting like a lawyer. Whether 
discussing anti-Semitism, trade unions, psychiatric abuse, or any other topic, he 
wanted to have numerous examples to point to, and not just raise charges. He 
believed this approach made confrontation more acceptable to US allies “because 
I wasn't engaged in insults, but facts.”143 
US-led condemnation in the CSCE process put Soviet leaders on the 
defensive. In Madrid, the Eastern bloc tried to move the debate away from 
compliance with past agreements by emphasizing new proposals. Generally they 
took a defensive posture of protesting “interference” in their internal affairs.144 
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The Soviets had lost the initiative in international diplomacy. Despite the apparent 
triumph at Helsinki they found their hegemony was being challenged. 
After the breakdown of détente, human rights advocacy in the CSCE 
framework continued to have an effect, although the fate of Soviet dissidents was 
generally grim. Reports on human rights in the USSR grew increasingly bleak in 
the first half of the 1980s. In 1982, Soviet authorities moved to suppress the few 
remaining members of the Moscow Helsinki Group and in September the 
Moscow Helsinki Group declared that it would discontinue its activities. 145 
However, the Soviet Union continued to be sensitive to outside pressure on 
human rights. Amid renewed Cold War tensions in 1983, the US CSCE 
delegation secured the release of several Soviet political prisoners. During this 
period the situation of children in religious families improved somewhat.146  
In addition to diplomacy and political activism centered on international 
conferences, the CSCE also strengthened pressures for change in the USSR by 
fostering increases in social and cultural contacts. The Iron Curtain was no longer 
as solid as it had once been, partly due to the increased contact that the CSCE 
helped establish. Commercial ties expanded and visitors flowed from country to 
country, increasing the impact of “globalizing influences and integrationist 
processes.”147 Politburo members raised concerns about the Reagan 
administration and American press and television “opening a strong anti-soviet 
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propaganda” regarding Jews in the USSR.148 Western radio continued to be 
popular for entertainment and news. The commitments to fostering human 
contacts, an important point of contention in the debates in drafting the Final Act, 
turned out to be important in continuing peaceful pressure on the Soviet system 
after diplomatic contacts grew colder. 
 Soviet documents suggest that even the shocking January 1980 exile of 
Andrei Sakharov to the isolated city of Gorky was less to demonstrate Soviet 
power and insult the West than it was the result of fears regarding his meetings 
with foreigners, whether Western correspondents and officials or members of the 
Polish or Czechoslovak opposition. Claiming that 1,200 anti-Soviet radio 
broadcasts from Western stations were made using materials Sakharov provided, 
the KGB wanted to prevent him from sending written appeals to the West. They 
remained concerned that despite his “crimes,” putting Sakharov on trial could 
entail “grave political complications.” During the time it would take to formally 
investigate a case and conduct a trial, at least two months, they expected the West 
“to stir up clamorous anti-Soviet campaigns which would be difficult to counter, 
because legislation governing procedure in criminal cases prohibits the use of 
materials from cases under investigation for the purposes of propaganda before 
the proceedings have been completed.” Instead it seemed expedient to “apply 
administrative measures in the Sakharov case that would make it possible to halt 
his contacts with foreigners and to seriously hamper his hostile activity,” 
                                                 




including as “a preventive measure his expulsion from Moscow to a part of the 
country closed to foreigners.” Whether or not the procedural requirements of a 
trial would have actually hindered propaganda efforts or if this was just a self-
serving justification, it appears that the Sakharov exile was not merely punitive or 
meant to set an example, but was intended to isolate him and stifle his work that 
harmed the regime.149 In his new residence the KGB prevented foreigners and 
“anti-social elements” from meeting him.150 Soviet leaders understood dissidence 
as a threat directly related to the Cold War and not just an internal problem. 
 Elena Bonner came to be a more immediate concern when she served as 
Sakharov’s messenger from Gorky to contacts with the West. Although her 
involvement in the circulation of Sakharov’s articles made her liable to criminal 
punishment, it was deemed inexpedient to immediately launch a criminal case 
against her, “since it would provide the adversary with additional material for 
speculating on Sakharov’s persecution.”151 Instead, personal searches would be 
used to confiscate materials. International concern was not the only factor in 
Soviet leniency. The KGB noted that allowing Bonner to travel to Italy would be 
“tactically justified” because it would arouse “surprise and envy on the part of her 
and Sakharov's accomplices, and this leads to greater discords and hostility within 
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their milieu.”152 Whether or not Soviet leaders believed they were acting 
humanely toward Sakharov and Bonner, increased sensitivity toward Western 
concerns impacted the way they were treated.  
 Despite the seeming permanence of the Iron Curtain, gradual changes 
were set in motion by the CSCE process and the activists who helped establish 
human rights as a fundamental concern. By disputing the legitimacy of Soviet 
communism by broadcasting its failures, they were able to undermine the 
ideological mission of the USSR. Human rights advocacy within the Soviet Union 
and from abroad prevented the Final Act from being an ideological success for the 
Soviet Union. While dissidents did not immediately succeed in making major 
changes to the Soviet system they did form a potential center of opposition that 
could be expressed when the grip of repression was loosened. Their opportunity 
would come after a new General Secretary ascended to power in the Soviet 
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Iron Curtain Opens, Iron Fist Loosens, 1985-1989 
 
The succession of Mikhail Gorbachev to General Secretary on March 11, 
1985 began a new era in domestic and foreign policy. In a vain attempt to renew 
the appeal of Soviet socialism through a top-down process of restructuring, the 
Soviet leadership unleashed social forces that they were unable to harness and 
soon escaped from their control. Gorbachev hoped to reinvigorate the USSR after 
a long period of stagnation, which required revitalizing the economy, establishing 
a political situation that rewarded initiative and competence, and energizing 
Soviet society. He sought a foreign policy conducive to domestic reform, which 
required ending the drain of the arms race and reducing the power of the military-
industrial complex. Under his leadership the Soviet Union adopted Western 
human rights norms, and in his advocacy for a common European home 
Gorbachev referred to Helsinki principles. As Gorbachev and his New Thinking 
comrades looked west, the principles established in the CSCE process served as 
admission standards to the European order they hoped to join. The CSCE was an 
important influence on Soviet reform, which opened the door to an increased 
dissident effect on foreign and domestic policy.  
Curiously, part of the reason for Gorbachev’s rise to the top level of power 
at a comparatively young age was his relationship with Yuri Andropov, the 
suspicious hardliner who had engineered the crackdown on the dissident 
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movement. Andropov was originally from the Stavropol region, where Gorbachev 
lived, and they met regularly during the 1970s while Gorbachev headed the 
Stavropol Communist Party. Paradoxically, though Andropov was ruthless in 
cracking down on people he viewed as threats to the Soviet system, he also 
appeared to believe that corruption and stagnation threatened the system, and 
instituted mild reforms during his brief period as General Secretary from 
November 1982 until his death in February 1984.153 Anatoly Chernyaev, who 
became an important Gorbachev aide, recorded that many people in the Soviet 
leadership had “great expectations for Andropov” for similar reasons they 
expected Gorbachev would provide competent and energetic leadership. The 
selection of Chernenko, who was associated with “Brezhnevism” and 
complacency, to succeed Andropov was a disappointment. Upon Chernenko’s 
death little more than a year later, Gorbachev’s nomination was met with a 
massive outburst of applause because “the people [were] tired of stagnation and 
demonstrations of official stupidity.”154 Already it appeared likely that change 
would come to the Soviet system, though even Gorbachev did not know exactly 
what change would look like. 
Change in foreign policy came soon. At first the Soviets continued to act 
defensively on human rights. The first CSCE meeting entirely devoted to human 
rights, the Ottawa Meeting of Experts on Human Rights, was held from April 7 to 
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June 17, 1985, where the Soviets were the target of Western criticism. Their 
routine damage control included retorting with human rights shortcomings of 
critics which often rang hollow or sounded contrived.155 Gorbachev’s July 1985 
appointment of Eduard Shevardnadze to replace Andrei Gromyko as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs marked a new era in foreign policy. Shevardnadze had held a 
number of positions in the Georgian Communist Party, culminating in his 
leadership of the Georgian party as First Secretary, but he had little experience in 
foreign affairs. However, Gorbachev had long trusted him and was eager for a 
fresh approach to foreign policy.156 In his memoir, Shevardnadze wrote that he 
“knew many people in the dissident movement in Georgia quite well” and spoke 
with them a number of times. He stated that while many of their complaints were 
beyond his power to change, he managed to keep “hundreds of young people” out 
of harm’s way by having open debates when he could have had people 
prosecuted.157 Shevardnadze proved himself to be a capable minister and an 
adamant reformer. 
Shevardnadze considered his primary objective to “create the maximum 
favorable external conditions needed in order to conduct internal reform.”158 At 
the time of his appointment it was unclear what reforms were to be made, as the 
full agenda of perestroika took time to develop. The early focus appeared to be on 
economic restructuring and acceleration and improved viability and rationality. 
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Helsinki Watch received information on new political trials in1985, which 
illustrated to them that human rights policies had not changed under 
Gorbachev.159 It was unclear how far Gorbachev thought he would go or how far 
he really wanted to go. Yet as early as October, Soviet observers sensed a change. 
Chernayev noted in a diary entry that “in trying to show good intentions to 
Europe, we are changing too”160 
 Gorbachev had been heavily influenced by his experiences abroad and the 
people he met in his travels. Starting in the late 1960s his party rank enabled him 
to travel extensively in Europe.161 Some of his most important contacts were with 
foreign leftists. In June 1984 Gorbachev led the Soviet delegation to the funeral of 
Italian Communist Party leader Enrico Berlinguer. Gorbachev came away 
impressed with the PCI, and wanted to establish closer relations. The PCI had 
been openly sympathetic to the Prague spring, condemned the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia, and rejected Moscow domination of the international communist 
movement.162 When Gorbachev met in early 1989 with Italian Communist leader 
Acille Occhetto, he was pressed on Helsinki compliance in the Soviet satellites.163 
Willy Brandt and Spain’s Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez helped 
Gorbachev develop his views of socialism with a democratic direction. But it was 
not only the political left that influenced Gorbachev. He would refer to his 
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December 1984 trip to Great Britain as “eye-opening” and the beginning of a 
“good personal relationship” with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.164 
Importantly, he would also come to have good personal relations with Ronald 
Reagan.  
Gorbachev also looked for advice from Soviet officials who understood 
the world abroad. For example, in the 1970s Alexander Yakovlev fell out of favor 
among Brezhnev’s circle and took the post of Soviet ambassador to Canada as a 
kind of political exile. Gorbachev met him on a trip abroad and in 1983 
Gorbachev had Yakovlev appointed to director of the Institute of World Economy 
and International Relations (IMEMO) research organization.165 Yakovlev would 
serve as an important adviser and partisan of the perestroika reform program. 
Another important reformer among Gorbachev’s advisors was Anatoly 
Chernyaev, a foreign policy expert who among other duties had written some 
speeches for Brezhnev. Gorbachev selected him as an aide in February 1986 and 
he would become one of Gorbachev’s closest advisors.166 It should also be noted 
that Gorbachev was accompanied by his wife Raisa on all his foreign trips starting 
in 1984, and the two of them discussed everything.167 Gorbachev’s experiences, 
relations, and leadership style led him to greater understanding of the opinions, 
expectations, and reality of the world beyond the Iron Curtain. 
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 In 1986 changes in the Soviet Union’s approach to human rights became 
more apparent. Already during the Bern CSCE Meeting of Experts on Human 
Contacts, held in April and May, a more positive Soviet attitude was noticed.168 
Gorbachev met with US Congressmen Fascell and Broomfield on April 4, where 
they discussed the Afghanistan war and human rights and “set the stage for future 
dialogue” between the superpowers. Chernyaev believed this meeting hardened 
Gorbachev’s “already existing resolve to end ‘the Sakharov affair.’”169 When 
American conditions to hold the Reykjavik summit included the release of 25 
prisoners, the Soviet response, developed at a September 1986 politburo meeting 
was to institute incremental releases, including Orlov one month later. Yet the 
Soviets also rhetorically attacked the US administration as saboteurs of 
peacemaking efforts and criticized America “on the usual grounds: the homeless, 
crime on the streets, unemployment, racism, violating human rights in the Third 
World, etc.”170 Gorbachev wanted to take the initiative in foreign policy and 
prevent a perception that events were being driven by the United States. Soviet 
moves in 1986 met with cautious optimism from Helsinki Watch, which noted 
that “In 1986, as Mr. Gorbachev consolidated his power, the situation began to 
change.” The USSR had demonstrated “increased flexibility” in the field of 
human rights.171 
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 A new human rights regime, along with big strides in disarmament efforts, 
breathed new life into Soviet diplomacy and also served as part of an effort to 
recharge domestic excitement for the Soviet system that had waned during the 
period of stagnation. Shevardnadze surprised George Shultz by taking the 
initiative on human rights in discussions. Previously the topic of human rights 
“had been the American’s favorite hobbyhorse, and a taboo for us.”172 Gorbachev 
found it desirable to take ideological initiative for the USSR and undercut 
Western hard-liners. In Politburo discussions Gorbachev emphasized the need to 
make the Soviet Union attractive. “We need to work out a conception on human 
rights, both at home and abroad.”  It was necessary to put an end to the routine 
because it “only produces dissidents.”  In October 1986 he directed the Politburo 
to “see what we can do” on human rights. “We need to open a way back to the 
Soviet Union for thousands of emigrants, to move this current in the opposite 
direction.”173  
The desire to increase enthusiasm for the Soviet Union at home and 
abroad was a major factor when Soviet leaders weighed the costs and benefits of 
releasing Sakharov and Bonner from exile. Gorbachev and Yakovlev believed 
that neither the democratization of the country nor normal relations with the 
outside world would be possible while Sakharov remained in exile, but they 
needed to act delicately to not upset party conservatives or give the KGB an 
opportunity to block the move. On December 16 Gorbachev telephoned Sakharov 
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to personally inform him and his wife that their internal exile ended.174 They 
expected that the couple would again engage in opposition activity but despite the 
possible consequences, “Sakharov's return to Moscow will entail fewer political 
costs than his continued isolation in Gorky.”175 For the new Soviet leadership now 
ready to make big changes, isolating Sakharov was a bigger obstacle to their goals 
than allowing Sakharov to be politically active and free to meet foreigners in 
Moscow. 
 The effect of the dissident movement and Helsinki activism on the 
initiation of reform is hard to judge. A Moscow human rights activist summed up 
the situation in 1984 as, “the movement never became a mass movement and the 
immediate demands of the dissidents were almost wholly frustrated.”176 However, 
dissident voices were widely known through underground publications and 
Western radio broadcasts. Chernayev believed “Gorbachev’s preparation for a 
break with the primitive, falsified, official Party version of Soviet history” was his 
serious reading of samizdat (unsanctioned self-published works) and tamizdat 
(works published abroad), as well as restricted Progress publications for the 
elite.177 Sakharov’s early samizdat essay Progress, Coexistence, and Intellectual 
Freedom was widely read and discussed among reformist thinkers.178 It is difficult 
to evaluate the effect that dissident publications had on future reformers, as 
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opposed to their own experiences trying to get anything useful done in the Soviet 
system. Tracing influences is not a straightforward process when there are so 
many factors involved and much of the source material consists of subjective 
statements with potential to be self-serving. However, in light of their wide 
audience it is likely that dissidents had some effect on the way reformers 
understood the nature of the problem.  
It is easier to see the effect of dissidents after Gorbachev opened the gates 
in 1985 and 1986. Social forces released in Gorbachev’s efforts to invigorate 
Soviet society, spurred on by the Chernobyl disaster as well as by Gorbachev’s 
increasing confidence, were influenced by dissidents who would again become 
active, this time as participants in a broader reform movement. 179 The KGB, who 
continued to monitor Sakharov and Bonner, noted that the troublesome couple 
was becoming active in newly emerging civil society organizations, including the 
Moscow Tribune, a political science study group, and Memorial, which 
commemorated the victims of Stalinism and encouraged further democratization 
of the Soviet system. A participant in Memorial’s founding believed the group 
should be the heir of the Helsinki Watch Group and actively defend human rights 
in the USSR and abroad.180 The KGB was alarmed in 1989 that a mining strike 
committee was distributing information about Sakharov’s support for the strike. 
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“Great significance is attached to his endorsement of the political demands 
submitted by the miners, as well as of the decisiveness and purposefulness of their 
actions.”181 In addition, Boris Yeltsin’s removal from Communist Party 
leadership in late 1987 started a process that would bring him into contact with 
former dissidents and other radicals.182  
The dissident effect was prominent in the 1989 Congress of People’s 
Deputies, elected in the first truly competitive elections in Soviet history. 
Televised sessions were seen by an estimated 200 million people.183 Sakharov 
was an active, outspoken member of the Congress, and garnered much support.184 
The presence of a leading dissident, who had for years been a symbol of 
conscience rallying the West, as a prominent member of the Soviet Union’s first 
elected government body with any power, heralded a major change in the human 
rights situation. Yuri Orlov, certainly not a neutral observer, held that dissidents 
provided the moral example to the “fourth Russian Revolution” that was 
underway.185 When Sakharov died in December 1989, his memorial service might 
not have brought out the massive numbers of supporters that democrats hoped for, 
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but it was still attended by tens of thousands of people.186 Considering the dismal 
showing that sitting Communist party officials made when up for popular 
election, the dissidents’ lack of association with the current system may have 
gained them popular legitimacy and credibility as outsiders.187 While, like most 
Soviet citizens they lacked experience in politics, they came to the era of 
perestroika and glasnost already having a developed message of further 
democratization, and they had networks of associates with experience working 
together and organizing. Earlier manifestos and movements could be handy in 
crafting alternatives that were needed as reforms bogged down. 
Dissidents also had an effect on Western diplomacy throughout the era of 
Gorbachev’s reforms. In the spring of 1986, three months after his release from a 
Soviet labor camp into exile abroad, Anatoly Shcharansky toured the United 
States. When speaking to Jewish organizations, the Reagan administration, and 
Congress, he advocated a strategy of using both public and quiet diplomacy to 
defend human rights and the Jewish community in the Soviet Union.188 When 
Elena Bonner travelled to the West in early 1986 she participated in press 
conferences, panels, and meetings with foreign leaders. Bonner and Shcharansky 
urged American officials to continue using the Helsinki process to discuss human 
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rights questions and defend human rights.189 Orlov also had an influence on 
Western diplomacy. He had a discussion with Reagan and Shultz shortly before 
the Reykjavik summit and travelled to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting with 
Catherine Fitzpatrick from Helsinki Watch. The position he took on a Soviet 
proposal to hold a human rights meeting in Moscow was that the West should 
agree to attend with strong conditions, which is the course that the West would 
take.190 While dissidents were not driving policy either at superpower summits or 
at CSCE gatherings, they were sought for advice on upholding human rights. 
The third CSCE follow-up meeting, which was held in Vienna from 
November 4,1986, to January 19, 1989, formed the backdrop for much of this 
period. The Vienna conference not only measured the Soviet Union’s 
improvement in human rights but became a driving force in Soviet reforms. The 
conference began inauspiciously. Anatoly Marchenko, a Soviet dissident who had 
recently written to CSCE delegates about human rights abuses in the Soviet 
Union, died in prison shortly after the conference began. Then, Shevardnadze 
shocked the attendees by proposing a human rights conference in Moscow in his 
opening statement.191 The proposal was officially submitted a month later, and the 
Soviet delegation was vague as to what the goals of the conference would be. A 
year of unproductive debate ensued as Western delegations heavily criticized the 
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USSR.192 Shevardnadze writes that he “was convinced that the conference was 
essential in order to show the world how far we intended to go and, beyond that, 
to provide an impetus for democratization and the perestroika of legislation in 
everything related to human affairs.” Not surprisingly many of his Politburo 
colleagues had difficulty accepting his argument that signing the Final act meant 
assuming obligations and acknowledging the right of other signatories to review 
their compliance, and “stormy debates” ensued.193 Whether or not Shevardnadze 
is revealing all of the motivations and this wasn’t another example of diplomacy 
as a tactical maneuver against the class enemy, the proposal remained and served 
as a commitment to holding a meeting so long as the West would accept, which 
they would only do if the Soviets demonstrated concrete improvements. 
As the Vienna conference went on, the Soviets gradually showed better 
human rights observance as Gorbachev cautiously advanced his reform program. 
Snyder writes that “for many observers, progress on the proposed Moscow 
conference served as a barometer of Eastern advancement on human rights” since 
the formal conference proposal, and thus agreement on a concluding document 
was conditioned on Soviet progress in human rights.194 The CSCE came to serve 
as an international body reviewing the progress of perestroika and measuring 
reform. The Soviets began to hold more meetings with the press, to accept lists of 
refuseniks and political prisoners, and to meet with NGOs and activists. Though 
part of the changed behavior was likely a cynical attempt to show cosmetic 
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changes, the Soviets demonstrated increased sensitivity to human rights concerns, 
and they would be continually pressed for improvement. In 1987 the USSR took 
meaningful steps including releasing some political prisoners, acting on family 
reunification cases, and curbing radio jamming. They also responded for the first 
time to the US Congressional Helsinki Commission, resolving 137 of the 442 
cases the commission presented, and even began responding to Helsinki Watch.195 
Jeri Laber, chair of Helsinki Watch, celebrated that “Reforms we had demanded 
as conditions for the Moscow human rights conference…had actually come to 
pass.”196 
The Vienna conference closed on January 19, 1989, with the West 
agreeing to meet in Moscow after first holding conferences on the human 
dimension in Paris and Copenhagen. The West had held the Soviets to their word. 
The USSR released numerous political prisoners and issued exit visas with much 
less restriction. Afterward Gorbachev showed a greater commitment to human 
rights than external pressure required.197 The Paris Conference on the Human 
Dimension, from May 30 to June 23, 1989 was “characterized by a good 
atmosphere, with very limited conflict among East-West lines.”198 Human rights 
moved from an element of East-West confrontation to a more collaborative 
endeavor. 
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 By 1989, the Soviet human rights situation had drastically improved, 
partly due to foreign pressure. Chernyaev remarked, “Paradoxical as it may seem, 
efforts toward disarmament and new relations with the West – originally meant 
‘to create favorable external conditions for perestroika’ – in fact became its 
locomotive” as contacts with Western Europe impacted the democratization 
process.199 Reformers sometimes found foreign pressure useful. One Gorbachev 
aide remarked that “Gorbachev’s team, which was pushing for internal reforms, in 
particular in the area of emigration policy, used US requests in the humanitarian 
field as a lever in our internal debates.”200 Helsinki Watch reports on the Soviet 
Union adopted an increasingly hopeful tone, especially in contrast to the dismal 
feeling of the early 1980s. By 1989 a sense of triumphalism is apparent, combined 
with reminders of the need for continued monitoring including “in the Soviet 
Union, where problems persist.” Soviet reforms were described as contradictory, 
hesitant, and shuffling.201  
When Gorbachev invoked the “idea of the common European home” in 
his July 1989 speech to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, he praised the 
Helsinki process. He characterized Europe as paying its debts to humankind for 
colonialism and world war by pressing for changes in international relations in the 
spirit of humanism, equality, and justice, and by setting an example of democracy 
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and social achievements.202 Gorbachev credited the Helsinki process with 
initiating this “immense effort of world significance.” He pronounced a position 
on human rights in international diplomacy that was nearly the complete opposite 
from that of Brezhnev.  
“A world in which military arsenals would be cut but in which human 
rights would be violated cannot feel secure. We, for our part, have arrived 
at this conclusion finally and irrevocably.”203 
Gorbachev hailed the Vienna conference as “a genuine breakthrough.” 
Gorbachev’s presentation of human rights did not conflict with his socialist ideals, 
and importantly, CSCE terminology accommodated an approach that could be 
characterized as universal and humanitarian instead of Western and capitalist. 
Soviet human rights policy had shifted into a non-confrontational, cooperative 
framework by acknowledging the legitimacy of the role of human rights in 
diplomacy and international security. 
The CSCE process figures large among foreign influences on Soviet 
human rights improvement. A meeting of Warsaw Pact representatives in the 
summer of 1989 paid special attention to the process of building a “pan-European 
home” while analyzing the results of the recent CSCE meetings. Emphasis was 
placed “on the interests and values common for the European peoples, on the need 
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for equal dialogue and an enhancement of contacts in various areas.”204 
Shevardnadze characterized Soviet foreign policy as having “graduated from the 
‘academy of Europe,’ the school of the Helsinki process.”205 Heraclides is 
cautious to avoid making firm judgment on the effect of Helsinki. He notes that 
many public pronouncements should be treated with caution, for they are at least 
partly self-serving: “Participants are expected to praise the CSCE in a CSCE 
meeting, and a CSCE document is bound to praise the process.” Nonetheless he 
considers it “reasonable” for the CSCE to take some credit, and “without doubt it 
provided a framework on which to build a new pan-European regime when the 
time came in 1989-90.”206 
 The increased trust that was fostered by responsiveness in human rights 
issues helped end the East-West confrontation. Gorbachev’s “anti-Fulton” address 
to the United Nations in December 1988 not only declared a unilateral withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and massive reductions in armed forces, but 
also promised to expand participation in human rights monitoring of the UN and 
CSCE and pledged to end arrests for political purposes. The speech met with 
massive applause and prompted Shultz to remark that Gorbachev had declared the 
Cold War over.207 The place of human rights in the easing of superpower tensions 
is indicated by a February 1989 cable by US Ambassador to the Soviet Union 
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Jack Matlock. He underscored that the most central US interest remained “the 
long-term transformation of the Soviet Union into a society with effective organic 
constraints on the use of military force outside its borders.” Human rights “must 
of course remain a key element in US policy” but many human rights issues could 
now be approached “under the rubric of ‘cooperation’ rather than 
confrontation.”208 Yet disagreement in the US intelligence community remained 
about Soviet sincerity and the permanence of Soviet policy changes. A 1989 
National Intelligence Estimate highlighted these disagreements and emphasized 
that “for the foreseeable future, the USSR will remain the West’s principle 
adversary.”209 Nevertheless, relations improved. CSCE Negotiations after 1989 
onwards were “no longer bloc-to-bloc.” Central and East Europe states under new 
non-communist leadership became protagonists in the human dimension.210 
Problems did persist in the Soviet Union. The country had yet to fully reach 
Helsinki standards, the military and KGB were sometimes operating behind the 
back of political leadership, and a humanitarian crisis loomed.211 Nevertheless, by 
the end of 1989 the USSR had made substantial progress in upholding human 
rights and its foreign policy had made human rights no longer a point of 
competition, but instead in item of cooperation. 
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One Important Factor 
 
The CSCE process, including contributions from dissidents, diplomats, 
politicians, and activists, had a direct influence on facilitating change in the Soviet 
Union, and in fostering the East-West trust and reconciliation that was crucial for 
ending the Cold War. It was a gradual process and perhaps not the most important 
factor, but the Helsinki process helped establish human rights advocacy as a more 
prominent feature of the East-West divide, a part that opened itself to the 
participation of private groups and individuals. From high level diplomacy and 
also from below, pressure mounted on the Soviet leadership that finally found 
traction when the system was opened to reform and reconciliation. 
Because human rights cooperation took place concurrently with the end of 
Cold War confrontation, it should be considered whether human rights advocacy 
was a driving force in ending the Cold War or whether the thawing of the Cold 
War, with an easing of the arms race and decreasing mistrust, expansionism, and 
ideological hostility made cooperation on human rights possible. The answer is 
not clear. Progress in the Soviet Union’s human rights practices was one factor in 
gaining Western trust, but not the only one. The increase in East-West trust that 
made an end to the Cold War confrontation more achievable also made further 
cooperation on human rights more achievable. The human rights contest was one 
aspect of the East-West conflict, a contest of broader ideological and geopolitical 
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concerns. This means that the human rights contest between the Soviet authorities 
and their adversaries was shaped by the Cold War context it operated in. It also 
means that the convergence of human rights values spelled the end of one 
important aspect of the Cold War, helping to bring about conditions needed to end 
other aspects. Perhaps crucially for the ideologues, Helsinki norms could be 
presented as universal and humanitarian instead of Western and capitalist. 
After 1989 the USSR would face the challenges of upholding human 
rights as the nation disintegrated and top leaders conspired to uphold their own 
interest, while the satellite republics would face the challenges of emerging as 
truly independent and democratic states in a chaotic international environment. 
Tensions remained between the Soviet Union and the West, but improvement in 
human rights had become largely a cooperative endeavor between domestic and 
foreign rivals. A study of developing human rights norms in the satellite states 
might look similar as they tended to take the Moscow line on human rights until 
Gorbachev changed too much, and human rights advocates were suppressed until 
the great transitions of 1989.  
But the Soviets made undeniable progress. By 1989 the Soviet Union was 
at the center of major changes in internal and international human rights policy. 
Soviet leaders released political prisoners and legalized public gatherings and 
organizations not sanctioned by the Party. The conclusion of the Vienna 
Conference and Gorbachev’s embracing of Helsinki principles at Strasbourg 
meant the integration of the USSR into a new pan-European human rights regime. 
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When dissidents became prominent actors in Soviet government and civil society 
a major shift had been marked. 
Perhaps the Helsinki network deserves a place as one of the periodic, 
quickly crushed rebellions against Soviet power. If so, it was similar to the 
rebellions of the Prague Spring and Solidarity in that its partisans would 
ultimately come back to haunt the regime. The CSCE certainly deserves credit as 
a primary motor of the human rights component to the East-West confrontation 
and reconciliation. It was also an influence in pushing the Soviet Union towards 
political reform, and deserves a place among other factors in Soviet reform such 
as economic trouble, generational change within the intelligentsia, and the 
Chernobyl disaster. In order to step out from behind the Iron Curtain the Soviet 
Union had to adopt the human rights standards that the West fought to include in 
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